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* Assistant Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the Thomas Jefferson School of Law Junior
Faculty Writing Workshop as well as Matthew Adler, Joshua Douglas, Michael Rich, and
Matt Schaefer. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Citizens United v. FEC, in which the Justices engaged in a lengthy exchange concerning the
facial and as-applied challenges doctrine. No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010).
Unfortunately, because of the timing, it was not possible to incorporate the relevant points from
Citizens United into this Article. However, the case shines an even brighter light than many
of the Court's previous decisions on the problems facing the facial and as-applied challenges
doctrine that I seek to highlight in this piece. And, although the Court does not address what
I argue are the root causes of these problems, at least one aspect of Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion may provide reason for cautious optimism among critics of the facial and as-applied
challenges doctrine. Specifically, Justice Kennedy acknowledges that “the distinction between
facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that
it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional
challenge.” Id. slip op. at 14.
1 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 236 (1994).
2 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).
3 Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex. 1995); see Dorf,
supra note 1 at 236 (“Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconsti-
tutional in one of two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or (2) the court
may find the statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of circumstances.”); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (summarizing the conventional account of facial and as-applied
challenges); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 360 (1998) (“Litigants in the federal courts can
attack the constitutionality of legislative enactments in two ways: they can bring a facial chal-
lenge to the law, alleging that it is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or they can bring
an as-applied challenge, alleging that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the particular
facts that their case presents.”).
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INTRODUCTION
In the conventional account of the basic principles of constitutional adjudication,
constitutional challenges can be sorted into two distinct categories: “facial” challenges
and “as-applied” challenges.1  A facial attack is typically described as one where “no
application of the statute would be constitutional.”2  In contrast, courts define an as-
applied challenge as one “under which the plaintiff argues that a statute, even though
generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the
plaintiff’s particular circumstances.”3
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4 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1321.
5 See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190–91
(2008) (discussing the preference for as-applied challenges to facial challenges); David L.
Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 41, 55–56 (2006) (“The Court has explained that the act of striking down a statute on its
face stands in tension with several traditional components of the federal judicial role, including
a preference for resolving concrete disputes rather than abstract or speculative questions; a
deference to legislative judgments; and a reluctance to resort to the ‘strong medicine’ of
constitutional invalidation unless absolutely necessary.”); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial
Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1348 (2005) (“As-applied adjudication, of course, carries
with it important benefits. . . . [I]t ensures that courts do not make uncertain speculations
about how a law operates outside of the facts generated by the controversy before it.”).
6 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–30 (2006)
(discussing the Court’s preference for as-applied challenges); Fallon, supra note 3, at 1321
(“Traditional thinking has long held that the normal if not exclusive mode of constitutional
adjudication involves an as-applied challenge . . . .”); Isserles, supra note 3, at 361 (“As the
Supreme Court has made clear on numerous occasions, facial challenges are appropriate, if
at all, only in exceptional circumstances.”).
7 See infra notes 10–16 (discussing criticisms of Salerno’s characterization of facial and
as-applied challenges).
8 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
9 See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190 (“While some Members of the Court have
criticized the Salerno formulation, all agree that a facial challenge must fail where the statute
has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” (citation omitted)).
10 See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
880 (2005) (“The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is more illusory than
This facial and as-applied distinction provides more than a simple descriptive
account of two different results that a court might reach in a given case.  Instead, the
categories are believed to form the foundation for a set of substantive rules that deter-
mine when a court may employ one type of challenge or the other—when a court may
strike down a statute in its entirety or only overturn the application of the statute in
the case at hand.4  Under these rules, the law strongly favors as-applied challenges on
the grounds that they are more consistent with the goals of resolving concrete disputes
and deferring as much as possible to the legislative process.5  Facial challenges, on the
other hand, should be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.6  Perhaps
the most well-known, succinct, and controversial7 formulation of this idea was the
Supreme Court’s statement in United States v. Salerno that a “facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully” and
will only succeed if a litigant can “establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.”8
This account of facial and as-applied challenges is by now a familiar part of the
constitutional landscape and is generally accepted in the courts.9  Nevertheless, some
of the most basic details regarding the characteristics of the facial and as-applied
challenges categories and, in particular, how the preference for as-applied challenges
actually operates, remain surprisingly unclear.10  For instance, do the rules regarding
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the ready familiarity of the terms suggests. The nature of a ‘facial’ challenge is rarely explored
in the case law; when a description is provided it usually is only the unhelpful description that
such a challenge targets a statute ‘on its face.’”).
11 See generally Gans, supra note 5 (discussing facial invalidation as a matter of substantive
constitutional law and proposing criteria for determining whether to adopt constitutional rules
that lead to facial invalidation).
12 For an explanation of severability as a remedial doctrine, rather than a form of statutory
construction, see David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
639, 656–62 (2008).
13 See Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication:
A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2000) (“At best, there is a dis-
tinction between ‘facial’ and ‘as-applied’ challenges that comes in at the remedial stage, but this
is more aptly phrased as a distinction between facial invalidation (where the court completely
repeals an invalid rule) and partial invalidation (where the court amends, rather than repeals,
an invalid rule).”).
14 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1342 (describing facial challenges as a product of the relevant
doctrinal test and severability considerations).
15 See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)
(finding that “a more complete and readily identifiable set of facts that can be evaluated and
therefore that draws on a more nuanced application of the Virginia Act” was required in order
to entertain an as-applied challenge); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988) (“Challenges to the validity
of a statute as applied to specific facts . . . turn necessarily on a determination of what the adju-
dicative facts were . . . [and] can always be rephrased simply as an assertion of a federal right
or immunity with respect to the operative facts.”).
16 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 56 F.3d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(“[W]e . . . are unable to reach the merits because petitioners have not made a proper facial
challenge. . . . [I]f petitioners are to succeed, they must bring a constitutional challenge as
applied specifically to them.”); Dorf, supra note 1, at 239 (“Under Salerno, a litigant bringing
a facial rather than an as-applied challenge gains nothing.”).
17 See infra Part I (discussing the lack of clarity on this question among courts and scholars).
facial and as-applied challenges concern substantive constitutional law by limiting
the adoption and use of constitutional tests that might lead to the facial invalidation
of statutes?11  Or do they relate exclusively to the remedial doctrine of severability,12
which comes into play only after a court has applied the relevant constitutional test
and found a violation?13  Or both?14  Is the key to distinguishing between facial and
as-applied challenges the extent to which the court relies on the specific facts in the
case at hand to reach its decision?15  If so, when is it appropriate for a court to con-
sider something other than those specific facts?  Is the choice between a facial and
as-applied challenge one that the litigant makes when she brings her claim,16 or is
it one that a court makes when it addresses her claim?  Neither the case law, nor the
academic literature, provides a satisfactory answer to these problems.17
This Article argues that these important questions remain unanswered because
categorizing constitutional cases into “facial” and “as-applied” challenges, and rely-
ing on these categories to shape doctrine and inform case outcomes, is an inherently
flawed and fundamentally incoherent undertaking.  This is because the fate of a statute
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18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 Id. at 153–56.
20 See Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed ‘Purpose,’
119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2555–57 (2006) (discussing the use of facial and as-applied challenges
in the abortion context).
21 Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011–13 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux
Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176–1181 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
22 Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
23 Id.; see also Rachel D. King, Comment, A Back Door Solution: Stenberg v. Carhart
and the Answer to the Casey/Salerno Dilemma for Facial Challenges to Abortion Statutes,
50 EMORY L.J. 873, 885–87 (2001) (discussing the perceived tension between Salerno and
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence).
24 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006); see also After Ayotte, supra note 20, at 2257–58.
25 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323–24.
in the face of a constitutional challenge depends on distinct considerations—specif-
ically, the relevant substantive doctrine and the remedial severability rules—that
cannot be reduced to a single inquiry or set of rules.  Conflating these independent
concepts with one another under the “facial” and “as-applied” rubric has only served
to confuse each and obscure the real issues that animate the outcome in a given case.
Moreover, the as-applied and facial dichotomy has contributed to the increasing lack
of clarity across constitutional law by creating an inconsistent and unwarranted pre-
sumption against the adoption of robust constitutional tests on the grounds that they
might result in facial invalidation of statutes.
This phenomenon is perhaps most easily observed in the Court’s abortion juris-
prudence.  Beginning with the Supreme Court’s adoption in Roe v. Wade18 of a strict
scrutiny standard for evaluating laws prohibiting abortions—which asks whether a
statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest19—federal
courts had consistently invalidated, or upheld, challenged abortion regulations in their
entirety.20  Justice Scalia called this practice into question, however, in a 1992 dissent
from a denial of certiorari.21  Relying on the presumption in favor of as-applied chal-
lenges, as explained in Salerno, Scalia argued that a Guam law outlawing all abortions
except upon confirmation by two independent doctors that the pregnancy would endan-
ger the woman’s life or health could not be invalidated “on its face.”22  According to
Scalia, this was because a facial challenge can succeed only where there is “no set of
circumstances” in which the statute can be constitutionally applied and he could “see
no reason why the Guam law would not be constitutional at least in its application to
abortions conducted after the point at which the child may live outside the womb.”23
Despite Justice Scalia’s seemingly convincing observation, the Court continued
to assess the validity of abortion statutes in their entirety until 2006, when it signaled
a shift in favor of as-applied abortion challenges in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England.24  The case involved a New Hampshire statute that required
physicians to deliver written notification to a minor’s parents and wait forty-eight
hours before performing an abortion on that minor.25  New Hampshire conceded that
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26 Id. at 328.
27 Id. New Hampshire argued that the statute’s judicial bypass provision and the State’s
“competing harms” laws would protect patients and physicians when a minor was in need of
an immediate abortion, but the Supreme Court did not address this contention beyond noting
that both the district court and circuit court had rejected the argument. Id.
28 Id. at 323.
29 Id. at 328.
30 Id. at 329 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985)).
31 See id. at 329–31 (discussing the issue of remedy in the context of “facial challenges”
and outlining three principles for addressing the question).
32 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
33 Id. at 167.
34 Id. at 132–33.
35 Id. at 167.
36 Id.
37 Richmond Med. Ctr., for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding
that a doctor could not challenge a Virginia abortion statute following Carhart because “[h]e
has not indicated that he has any particular patient in mind, nor any discrete factual circum-
stance that is detailed by medical records or other similarly concrete evidence”). But see
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Surely the Court cannot mean that no
the law encompassed some small number of cases in which pregnant minors would
“need immediate abortions to avert serious and often irreversible damage to their
health”26 and that, under controlling precedent, “it would be unconstitutional to apply
the Act in a manner that subjects minors to significant health risks.”27  In a unanimous
opinion, the Court presumed the validity of its previous abortion cases28 and, accord-
ingly, quickly determined that the Act would be unconstitutional as-applied to minors
in need of an emergency abortion to ensure their health.29  It then turned its attention
to the issue of remedy.  The Court framed its remedial discussion by noting that the
“‘normal rule’” is that courts should employ “‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation’”30
to redress a constitutional violation and then proceeded to treat the distinction between
facial and as-applied challenges as purely a question of remedy.31
Just one year later, however, the Supreme Court revisited the abortion debate
in Gonzales v. Carhart,32 this time employing the presumption in favor of as-applied
challenges to help shape the appropriate standard for determining whether there was
a constitutional violation at all.33  In Carhart, as in Ayotte, a group of physicians
brought a pre-enforcement challenge to an abortion statute, the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003.34  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy re-
jected the physicians’ claim entirely, citing, among other things, the presumption in
favor of as-applied challenges.35  Rather than focusing on remedy, which was not at
issue, the Court concluded that the pre-enforcement “facial attack[ ] should not have
been entertained in the first instance.”36  Instead, the Court appeared to indicate, with-
out holding explicitly, that the preference for as-applied challenges meant that only a
woman (or her physician) who was facing a specific health risk could challenge the
statute.37  As Justice Kennedy explained, “the proper means to consider exceptions
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suit may be brought until a woman’s health is immediately jeopardized by the ban on intact
D&E.”).
38 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167; see also id. (“In an as-applied challenge the nature of the
medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.”).
39 See id. at 168 (“The Act is open to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete case.”).
40 Especially troublesome is that the majority appeared to rely on the as-applied challenges
presumption to avoid explaining the counters of what a “proper” challenge to the Act would
entail. See id. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court offers no clue on what a ‘proper’
lawsuit might look like.”); id. at 189–90 (“The Court envisions that in an as-applied challenge,
‘the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced.’ But it should not escape
notice that the record already includes hundreds and hundreds of pages of testimony identi-
fying ‘discrete and well-defined instances’ in which recourse to an intact D&E would better
protect the health of women with particular conditions.” (internal citations omitted)).
41 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
42 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167.
43 Since 2006, for example, the Supreme Court has employed the doctrine of facial and as-
applied challenges in the context of habeas corpus, campaign finance, and voting rights, among
other issues. See infra Part III (discussing problems presented by the use of the facial and as-
applied challenges dichotomy in different cases).
44 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1341 (“[F]acial challenges are less categorically distinct from
as-applied challenges than is often thought.”); Franklin, supra note 5, at 67 (“[T]here is no rigid
analytic dichotomy between as-applied and facial challenges.”).
[to the law] is by as-applied challenge” which he defined as those involving “discrete
and well-defined instances [when] a particular condition has or is likely to occur in
which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.”38  In this view, the prefer-
ence for as-applied challenges constrains the constitutional rule itself by forbidding
general pre-enforcement challenges and requiring, instead, a “discrete case”39 that
involves a plaintiff who has suffered or is facing a particular health risk as a result
of the act.40
The point here, of course, is not to examine the merits of the result in either
Carhart or Ayotte, but that the accounts of facial and as-applied challenges in each
are fundamentally inconsistent with one another.  In Ayotte, the facial and as-applied
challenges doctrine is defined as a remedial consideration that helps to determine the
appropriate course of action after a court has already found a constitutional violation.41
In Carhart, facial and as-applied challenges have nothing to do with remedy but rather
relate to the circumstances in which a litigant may bring, and a court should “entertain,”
a constitutional challenge in the first place.42
The result is a “doctrine” of facial and as-applied challenges that is everything and
nothing all at once—broad enough to govern both remedy and substantive law but so
empty and meaningless that it only serves to obscure and deflect attention from the
real issues at the heart of each.  And, because facial and as-applied challenges doctrine
is thought to offer generally applicable principles of constitutional adjudication, the
problem touches on a wide range of areas across constitutional law.43
To be sure, others have observed that the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges is not as clear-cut as it is traditionally made out to be.44  Indeed, at least one
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45 Dorf, supra note 1, at 294.
46 In his seminal article Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, Michael C. Dorf
suggests abandoning the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges in the conclusion
of the piece. Id. However, Dorf’s focus was on arguing against the validity of the Salerno rule
and explaining the interaction between substantive constitutional law, institutional competence,
and statutory interpretation in the resolution of facial challenges. Id. at 238. In this Article, I
pick up Dorf’s brief suggestion and attempt to show in detail why courts should do away with
the facial and as-applied challenges categories.
scholar, Michael C. Dorf, has argued that the concepts of “as-applied and facial chal-
lenges may confuse more than [they] illuminate[ ].”45  No article, however, has focused
on examining just why it is that the distinction between facial and as-applied chal-
lenges is so problematic, or made the case that the doctrine of facial and as-applied
challenges should be abandoned entirely.46  And, no article has explored the ways in
which courts have used the distinction to obscure important issues and unduly restrain
substantive constitutional doctrines.  This Article aims to fill those gaps.
In Part I, I examine the deep disagreement and confusion among commentators
and the courts about the facial and as-applied challenges categories.  Part II advances
the argument that any attempt to address these problems and construct a coherent doc-
trine of facial and as-applied challenges is inevitably destined to fail.  This is because
the categories are incapable of informing the two considerations that typically deter-
mine whether a court will strike a law down on its face: the relevant substantive con-
stitutional doctrine and the principles of severability.  Part III considers why, if my
claims in Parts I and II are correct, the idea that there is a uniform set of principles that
govern the use of facial and as-applied challenges has endured.  To do this, I explore
how the Court has used the doctrine in a number of different settings.  I argue that,
ultimately, the doctrine reveals itself as little more than a rhetorical device that Justices
use to add support for decisions they would have reached without it.  Further, I argue
that the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine does more harm than good by obscur-
ing the considerations that are truly important in resolving constitutional challenges
and artificially tilting constitutional law toward narrower rules and outcomes.  I con-
clude by urging the rejection of the idea that there is, or can ever be, a “law” of facial
and as-applied challenges.  I suggest instead that courts faced with these issues focus
directly on the constitutional rights and rules at issue and principles of severability.
I. WHAT, EXACTLY, IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED
CHALLENGES?
The law of facial and as-applied challenges claims to answer the question of when
a court can and should strike a statute down in its entirety in response to a successful
constitutional challenge.  The Supreme Court’s position on this issue can be readily
summarized in one word: rarely.  The Court has stated its general preference for as-
applied challenges consistently, albeit often without much elaboration as to exactly
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47 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–21 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. Valley
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912).
48 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Curiously, the “no set of circum-
stances” test did not seem relevant to the outcome of the Salerno case itself. Instead, the
Court appeared to indicate that the challenged portion of the Bail Reform Act would be con-
stitutionally valid in every case. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 240–42 (“At best [the “no set of
circumstances” test is] . . . a rhetorical flourish to reassure the reader: Because the suit is,
after all, a facial challenge, the reader need not worry that what is being upheld appears
constitutionally questionable.”).
49 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. For the argument that overbreadth does not present an excep-
tion to the (separate but related) rule that a litigant cannot successfully challenge a statute that
may constitutionally be applied to her, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP.
CT. REV. 1. A more detailed account of this position, and of the overbreadth rule generally, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
50 See Dorf, supra note 1, at 239–41.
51 See id. at 271–76, 279–81 (arguing that Salerno is inconsistent with substantive due
process and purpose-based constitutional doctrines).
52 Id. at 250.
53 Dorf used the Salerno case itself as an example of why this is so. Id. at 240–42. Salerno
involved a challenge to a provision of the federal Bail Reform Act that authorized the pretrial
detention without bail of an indictee on the basis that no release conditions could assure “‘the
safety of any other person and the community.’” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (quoting Bail Reform
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141(e) (2006)). The respondents argued that pre-trial detention on
how the preference should be implemented.47  It came closest to announcing a test to
determine whether a facial challenge is appropriate in United States v. Salerno when
it announced its “no set of circumstances” test, under which a facial challenge to a
statute cannot succeed if it has even a single constitutional application.48  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Salerno, cited the First Amendment’s overbreadth
doctrine as the sole exception to the this rule.49
For the past two decades, most of the scholarly attention to facial and as-applied
challenges has revolved around whether the Salerno test reflects the Court’s actual
practice.  Yet, scholars remain hopelessly at odds over what the Salerno rule, and the
facial and as-applied challenges categories, even mean.  Specifically, there is no con-
sensus about whether facial and as-applied challenges doctrine governs severability,
the structure of constitutional rights and rules, or some mixture of the two.  Michael
Dorf, for example, offered an early and compelling criticism of Salerno in a 1994
article, in which he argued that Salerno presented a “truly draconian” standard that
would be nearly impossible for litigants to meet50 but that its test did not, in fact,
appear to be the law since courts regularly accepted facial challenges that he believed
would fail the “no set of circumstances” test.51  Dorf argued that the Salerno test was,
at bottom, about severability—an irrebuttable presumption that “if the Act has any
constitutional applications, a court should construe them as a separate, constitutional
Act.”52  According to Dorf, this presumption would cause almost every facial chal-
lenge to fail because a court will almost always be able to conceive of at least one
circumstance in which the statute may be constitutionally applied.53  As a result, it
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this basis violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Id. at 746. The Court rejected both of
these claims. Id. at 755. However, Dorf argued, it need not have gone that far to reject a facial
challenge under the “no set of circumstances” test because “well established law allows a
judge to set bail at an amount appropriate to deter flight”; thus, the statute could be constitu-
tionally applied where a “defendant[ ] would flee regardless of how high bail is set.” Dorf,
supra note 1, at 241; see also Metzger, supra note 10, at 883 (“The claim that a statute is
unconstitutional in all its applications is usually quite implausible; a little imagination suffices
to produce at least one potentially constitutional application; indeed often it produces a fair
number of constitutional applications.”).
54 Dorf, supra note 1, at 239 (“If Salerno really set forth the governing standard, however,
litigants would rarely bring facial challenges.”).
55 Id. at 238–39 (“[These] constitutional doctrines . . . are inconsistent with a practice of
severing invalid applications of a statute.”); see also Gans, supra note 5, at 1348 (“Salerno
ignores the fact that courts, throughout constitutional jurisprudence, craft strategic doctrines
that preempt case-by-case review in an effort to make constitutional rights work better in
practice, and this proves its undoing.”).
56 Dorf, supra note 1, at 238–39.
57 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Consti-
tutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157 (1998) (“There is no such thing as a true as-applied
constitutional challenge. The very idea is a mistake.”).
58 Id. at 3.
59 Id. at 157.
60 Id.; see also Adler, supra note 13, at 1387 (“The Adler Model is clearly inconsistent with
the Salerno Doctrines. According to the Adler Model, all constitutional challenges are facial
challenges.”).
would leave litigants with little incentive to bring a facial challenge.54  He argued,
however, that in practice the Court did not actually follow the Salerno test in at least
three areas of constitutional law: the Equal Protection Clause, fundamental rights, and
doctrines that rely on legislative purpose.55  This inconsistency, and the factors that
motivated it, led Dorf to conclude that no single consideration governed the use of
facial challenges, which, he argued, involves a mixture of substantive constitutional
law, institutional competence and statutory interpretation.56
Matthew Adler took the critique against as-applied challenges further by arguing
that the very concept of an as-applied challenge was fundamentally flawed.57  This is
so, Adler claimed, because the Constitution exclusively “protects the rights-holder
from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong predicate or history); it does not protect
a particular action of hers from all the rules under which the action falls.”58  For ex-
ample, a person who has been punished for burning the American flag could succeed
on a First Amendment challenge if she was convicted under a statute that prohibited
flag burning, but not if she was convicted under a statute prohibiting arson.  Thus,
according to Adler, “[t]he very idea [of an as-applied challenge] is a mistake” because
“every constitutional challenge involves the facial scrutiny of rules”59 and the Supreme
Court’s stated preference for as-applied challenges is wrong because it “trade[s] on
the mistaken, albeit standard, notion that rule-applications can be properly described
as unconstitutional.”60
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61 Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269, 279–91 (2000)
(arguing that facial challenge issues usually can be reduced to questions about severability).
62 See Adler, supra note 13, at 1387–88.
63 Id. at 1387. In response to Adler, Richard Fallon, Jr. argues that facial challenges are not
“a distinct category of constitutional litigation” but are instead “best conceptualized as incidents
or outgrowths of as-applied litigation.” Fallon, supra note 3, at 1324. In Fallon’s view, as-
applied challenges are those that rely on case-by-case specification of statutes to determine
the multiple “subrules” of a statute and sever invalid from valid sub-rules to address the relevant
constitutional violation. Id. at 1368, 1329–34. Fallon largely accepts Adler’s central claim that
rights are rights against rules, but argues that the process of identifying and severing subrules
accounts for the judicial preference for as-applied challenges. Id. at 1329. But see Adler, supra
note 13, at 1381–84 (arguing that Fallon’s description of the use of subrules and severability
is imprecise). With respect to facial challenges, Fallon insightfully notes that there is no single,
trans-doctrinal formula for identifying the conditions for a facial challenge to succeed and
argues that the attempt to outline a single theory of facial and as-applied challenges is largely
unhelpful. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1324 (“[T]he incidence and success of facial challenges
are not—as the debate between Justices Stevens and Scalia suggests—governed by any general
formula defining the conditions for successful facial challenges.”). However, echoing the un-
helpful blending of severability and substantive law in the as-applied and facial dichotomy,
Fallon claims that severability and substantive constitutional rules are part of a single inquiry
that controls the use of facial challenges in each area of constitutional law. See id. at 1351
(“In other words, demands for relatively full specification [of statutory subrules] and limits
on severability are aspects of the particular constitutional tests developed by the Supreme
Court to enforce specific constitutional provisions.”); id. at 1356 (“[D]ebates about whether
a specific statute should be deemed invalid on its face . . . [involve] issues about the appropriate
framing and implementation of particular doctrinal tests.”).
64 Isserles, supra note 3, at 364.
65 Id. at 385–86.
Adler’s view of the factors animating the facial and as-applied challenges dis-
tinction stands in stark contrast to Dorf’s.  Whereas Dorf interprets the distinction
between the two categories (as conceived by the Court in Salerno) as turning on sever-
ability once a constitutional violation has been found,61 Adler believes that the differ-
ence lies in the nature of constitutional rights themselves—in particular, the extent to
which one views the Constitution as protecting certain private behavior as such against
all government intrusion or only protecting behavior from intrusion against constitu-
tionally flawed statutes.62  Indeed, as Adler explains, his view of facial and as-applied
challenges, and his critique of Salerno, “gives no primacy to the remedy of partial
invalidation over the remedy of facial invalidation; which remedy is appropriate is
an open question.”63
In response to Salerno’s critics, Marc Isserles attempted to reconcile the case
with the areas of law that Dorf and others had identified as inconsistent with Salerno
by arguing that its “no set of circumstances” concept was not a test at all, “but rather
a descriptive claim about a statute whose terms state an invalid rule of law.”64  Accord-
ing to Isserles, Salerno does not restrict the circumstances in which courts can facially
invalidate statutes.65  Instead, certain constitutional doctrines lead courts to find defects
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severability are not relevant to the determination of facial invalidity under a valid rule facial
challenge . . . .”).
73 Franklin, supra note 5, at 55 (“[W]e can ask the question that has preoccupied courts
and scholars for many years, particularly in the individual rights context: In what circumstances
should a statute be struck down on its face?”); see also Alfred Hill, Some Realism About
Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647 (2002).
74 See Metzger, supra note 10, at 876–77 (considering whether the facial challenges or
as-applied challenges are more appropriate in cases involving Congressional power).
75 Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 774 (2009) (“Unfortunately, the Roberts Court has not matched its
consistency in preferring as-applied constitutional adjudication with clarity about what this
preference means in practice.”).
in the statutes themselves, independent of any specific applications.66  A successful
challenge under one of these tests—which Isserles terms a “valid-rule” challenge67—
“renders every conceivable statutory application invalid”68 and thus is  consistent with
Salerno.  Although Adler and Isserles ultimately differ in their view of Salerno,69
similar to Adler, Isserles sees the relevant substantive constitutional test as the central
factor underlying the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges.70
As this brief overview indicates, commentators are in disagreement over whether
the facial and as-applied challenges categories are driven primarily by severability,71
the relevant substantive constitutional doctrine,72 or a mixture of the two.  Notwith-
standing this lack of agreement on the foundational issue of what differentiates the
facial and as-applied challenges categories from one another, the great majority of
scholarly attention in this area continues to focus on attempting to determine when
facial invalidation of statutes is appropriate as a general matter,73 or whether a par-
ticular area of the law is “consistent” with the preference for as-applied adjudication.74
The treatment of facial and as-applied challenges in the judiciary, meanwhile,
consists almost exclusively of debates over whether the Court is being faithful to the
presumption in favor of as-applied challenges in a given case.  Any attempt to explain
what this presumption actually means is glaringly absent from these exchanges.75
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its entirety was “highly questionable.” Id. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 74–80.
83 Id. at 81.
Moreover, individual Justices often appear to switch between defending, distinguishing,
and outright ignoring the preference without explanation when it suits their purposes.
City of Chicago v. Morales76 is illustrative of the superficial manner in which the
Court addresses facial and as-applied challenges and provides a useful entry point for
examining the flaws inherent in the use of the facial and as-applied challenges cate-
gories.  In Morales, the Court engaged in perhaps its most detailed discussion of facial
and as-applied challenges in recent years, with Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Scalia,
each weighing in on the issue at length.77  Yet, none of the opinions examined what
factors actually distinguish the two concepts and instead argued over whether the
majority’s decision was consistent with the “rules governing facial challenges.”78
The case involved a challenge to a Chicago ordinance that made it a crime for two
or more people, at least one of whom a police officer reasonably believed to be “a
criminal street gang member,” to remain in a public place “with no apparent purpose”
after the officer had ordered them to disperse.79  Justice Stevens, writing for a six-
Justice majority on the merits and a three-Justice plurality on the as-applied challenges
issue, found the law unconstitutionally vague and invalid in its entirety because it did
not establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement, and thereby gave “absolute
discretion to police officers to decide what activities”80 the law prohibited.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued at some length that the result should have been
foreclosed by Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” standard.81  He devoted the majority
of this discussion to defending Salerno’s status as settled law, appearing to take it
almost as a given that the standard had not been met.82  Indeed, according to Scalia,
the majority’s approach to facial challenges was so far off the mark that it “transposed
the burden of proof” and required the city to show that the ordinance was “valid in
all its applications.”83
Justice Stevens, for his part, appeared to accept Scalia’s charge that striking down
the Chicago ordinance in its entirety was inconsistent with Salerno.  Instead, he argued
that Salerno’s “test” was merely dicta and had never been the decisive factor in any
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Supreme Court case.84  Justice Stevens did not, however, propose an alternative
approach to guide the Court in employing facial challenges beyond concluding that
“a facial challenge” was “appropriate” in the case before the Court because “vague-
ness permeate[d] the ordinance.”85  Moreover, Stevens argued, even if the restrictive
Salerno standard applied to federal courts’ interpretations of federal statutes, it was the
Illinois Supreme Court that had struck the ordinance down and state courts should
not be bound by Salerno because it is a “prudential doctrine.”86  Strikingly absent from
Stevens’s opinion was any discussion of what differentiated facial and as-applied
challenges or an explanation of how and in what sense the Chicago ordinance could
constitutionally be applied.
Justice Scalia provided the sole account of how the law could be constitutionally
applied and, accordingly, the sole explanation for why it could not be struck down in
its entirety under Salerno.  The discussion came at the very end of Scalia’s treatment
of the facial and as-applied challenges issue.87  He began his analysis by reiterating
Salerno’s proposition that under the “normal criteria for facial challenges,” the gov-
ernment “can defeat [a] facial challenge by conjuring up a single valid application
of the law.”88  From there, true to that standard, Scalia proceeded to offer a single,
somewhat elaborate, example of what he believed to be a set of facts in which the ordi-
nance could be constitutionally applied. Scalia envisioned a set of facts reminiscent
of the musical West Side Story, in which a street gang (“the Jets”) is standing around
“staking out their turf” by “flashing gang signs and displaying their distinctive tattoos
to passersby” when, pursuant to the ordinance, a police officer orders them to disperse
but they fail to do so.89  Scalia’s explanation for why it would be constitutional to
apply the ordinance in that situation was limited to the following comment:
Even assuming (as the Justices in the majority do, but I do not)
that a law requiring obedience to a dispersal order is impermis-
sibly vague unless it is clear to the objects of the order, before its
issuance, that their conduct justifies it, I find it hard to believe
that the Jets would not have known they had it coming.  That
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should settle the matter of respondents’ facial challenge to the
ordinance’s vagueness.90
Far from settling the matter, however, Justice Scalia’s conclusory statement that
his example represents a valid application of the Chicago ordinance, and accordingly
precludes a “facial” challenge under Salerno, only raises questions.  This is because,
contrary to Scalia’s conclusion, it is by no means self-evident that the ordinance could
constitutionally be applied to his West Side Story example.  That conclusion only
follows if we accept two unstated assumptions about as-applied and facial chal-
lenges: one about the nature of constitutional rights and the other about the nature
of severability.  To see why this is so, consider: what does it mean for a law to have
constitutional applications?
With respect to the nature of substantive constitutional rights, Justice Scalia
concludes that the Chicago ordinance could have constitutional applications because
activity that could constitutionally be punished generally (such as the Jets example)
also falls under the ordinance.91  On this view, it would only be unconstitutional to
apply the ordinance to individuals who were engaged in conduct that was constitu-
tionally immune from punishment under any statute.  Though Scalia avoids this
point, along with the question of when a litigant would be able to bring a successful
as-applied challenge to the Chicago ordinance under his approach,92 it follows from
his analysis.  According to Scalia, the reason it would be constitutional to apply the
Chicago ordinance in his example is that the Jets’ “conduct [would] justif[y]”93 a dis-
persal order.  Therefore, only people whose conduct does not justify punishment—
those who “would not have known they had it coming”94—would be able to claim
the ordinance could not be applied to them.  Importantly, instead of providing a justi-
fication for this view of constitutional rights—in which the Constitution is concerned
exclusively with conduct and not laws95—Justice Scalia fails to address the matter
entirely and instead obscures the issue amidst a detailed discussion of “facial” and
“as-applied” challenges doctrine.
The amorphous presumption in favor of as-applied challenges, however, has no
bearing on Scalia’s conduct-oriented assumption about constitutional rights.  An
equally plausible account of the constitutional right at issue in Morales would render
the conduct of an individual punished under the Chicago ordinance irrelevant.  Under
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this view, the relevant constitutional rule would grant individuals a right not to be
punished pursuant to a law that is insufficiently clear as to what conduct it prohibits,
regardless of whether that person’s conduct could be punished under a different statute.
Justice Breyer made a similar point in his Morales concurrence in which he argued the
Court’s decision was not inconsistent with Salerno.96  As Breyer explained, “[t]he
ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied [his] discretion wisely
or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much dis-
cretion in every case.”97  Indeed, it seems that a vagueness doctrine would necessarily
be concerned with statutes rather than actions.  After all, the problem in these cases is
not that a person’s actions are “vague,” or a police officer’s dispersal order is “vague,”
it is that the law (or some portion of the law) is vague.  It is that the law itself fails
to give constitutionally sufficient notice of what it prohibits.  Under this view of the
right, all applications of the insufficiently clear Chicago ordinance—including Justice
Scalia’s West Side Story hypothetical—would be unconstitutional and Salerno’s
“test” would be met.
Assuming, however, that Justice Scalia was correct that the Chicago ordinance
could be constitutionally applied in some circumstances but not others, his conclusion
that striking the law down in its entirety could be done only by “ignoring our rules
governing facial challenges”98 requires making a second assumption: that unconstitu-
tional applications always can be severed from a statute.  Indeed, Scalia argues that a
single example of a constitutional application of the ordinance alone should prevent
the Court from striking it down in its entirety.99  But, he says nothing about how con-
stitutional violations under the ordinance could be remedied or how the ordinance’s
constitutional and unconstitutional applications should be severed from one another.
Would the law remain unchanged despite its unconstitutional applications, thereby
forcing citizens with the choice between complying with an unconstitutional dispersal
order and refusing and hoping for the best in court?  If the unconstitutional applica-
tions should be severed, could it be done without a significant judicial re-drafting
of the law?100  Scalia was not alone in his failure to address these questions.  Indeed,
despite the central role that “facial” and “as-applied” challenges played in Morales,
none of the opinions even so much as mentioned the issue of severability.  The failure
of the Justices to address the issue—which many commentators argue is a central, if
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not the central, factor in distinguishing facial and as-applied challenges101—reveals
the depth of confusion over what the facial and as-applied challenges categories even
mean, let alone the nature of the “rules” that govern their use.
Despite deep uncertainty about these fundamental issues, the distinction between
“facial” and “as-applied” challenges continues to play an important role in the courts
in a wide variety of substantive areas of constitutional law.  Federal appeals courts
generally describe Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” concept as the controlling test
for resolving facial challenges across almost all constitutional doctrines.102  And, while
the Supreme Court recently acknowledged disagreement among the Justices over the
continuing vitality of the Salerno formulation,103 it continues to rely on the distinction
between facial and as-applied challenges and, in particular, the preference for as-
applied challenges, in guiding its decisions.104
As the discussion of Morales above demonstrates, however, it is surprisingly
unclear what this preference actually means. Courts often seem to be talking past one
another in their discussions of the issue—sometimes treating it as a preference for
severability, sometimes as a rule governing substantive constitutional rights, and still
other times as a limitation on the use of pre-enforcement challenges.105  The result is
a facial and as-applied challenges doctrine that distracts and detracts from the analysis
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of the underlying issues in a case, rather than informing it.  The problem goes be-
yond merely contributing to confusion in the law.  In recent years, courts have begun
to employ the amorphous preference for as-applied challenges to shape substantive
constitutional doctrines, in favor of restrained rules and against more robust ones.106
This is not to say that narrow constitutional rules are inherently problematic— some-
times a narrow rule may represent the most faithful realization of the relevant consti-
tutional clause.  The trouble is that in using the so-called “preference” for as-applied
challenges to justify a narrow constitutional rule, courts have begun to avoid and
obscure the real issue: whether the particular constitutional provision is best imple-
mented by a narrow rule or a broader one.  Before considering this problem, however,
it is useful to take a more detailed look at exactly why the “facial” and “as-applied”
terms are inherently indisposed to a precise definition.
II. IS A COHERENT LAW OF FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES POSSIBLE?
While the current account of facial and as-applied challenges fails to delineate the
roles that severability and the nature of substantive constitutional rights play in the
distinction between the two categories, it does not necessarily follow that the project
of building a set of rules to govern when each type of challenge may be used is inher-
ently flawed.  One might argue that a uniform set of rules for facial and as-applied
challenges is workable and that the problem today is simply that the categories have
not yet been sufficiently well defined.  If courts and commentators could just develop
a clearer understanding of the relationship between substantive constitutional rules
and severability in the use of facial and as-applied challenges, the claim might go, then
a single set of rules for resolving when a court should strike down a law in its entirety
would be workable.  The difficulty with this position is that a deeper examination
of both constitutional rights (and the related tests and rules that give effect to those
rights) as well as the principles of severability reveals that attempting to create a single
inquiry or uniform set of rules to govern facial and as-applied challenges is both futile
and undesirable.  While the “facial” and “as-applied” challenges labels may be a con-
venient way to describe the outcome in a given case, that outcome ultimately depends
on a unique mixture of the facts of the case, the relevant constitutional protection, and
principles of severability.  A “doctrine” of facial and as-applied challenges would add
nothing to these inquiries.  Indeed, as we will see in Part III, the effort to create one
has done much to detract from them.
A. Facial and As-Applied Doctrine as a Framework for Interpreting
Constitutional Rights?
Consider, for example, a hypothetical law that makes it a crime to “be an imme-
diate family member of a person who commits a felony.”  Avon conspires with his
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nephew D’Angelo to sell heroin in Baltimore, Maryland.  After a meticulous and
dramatic investigation, the police learn that D’Angelo is scheduled to transport a large
quantity of drugs from Philadelphia to Baltimore at Avon’s instruction.  The police
stop D’Angelo while he is driving back to Baltimore with the drugs and convince him
to turn state’s evidence.  They then arrest Avon and charge him with both conspiracy
to distribute a controlled substance and violating our hypothetical law.  Avon pleads
guilty to the conspiracy charge but challenges the “immediate family member” law
on the grounds that it violates the substantive due process prohibition against vicarious
criminal liability in the absence of personal guilt.107  How might the facial and as-
applied challenges categories help inform the resolution of Avon’s claim?
Avon’s challenge to the law will likely rise or fall based on how one views the
Constitution’s prohibition against punishment based on “guilt-by-association.”  On
the one hand, Avon can argue that the personal guilt rule means the government may
not impose criminal liability on the basis of having a non-criminal relationship with
someone who commits a crime.  From this view, the “immediate family member” law
would be inherently flawed because it provides for criminal punishment on precisely
that prohibited basis.  The fact that, in this particular case, Avon did have a punish-
able relationship with D’Angelo and a direct involvement in D’Angelo’s felonious
drug activity would be irrelevant to his constitutional claim.108  Our hypothetical law,
by its terms, makes being the family member of someone who has committed a
felony the sole basis for punishment.  Accordingly, while there would be no doubt
about the constitutionality of Avon’s conspiracy conviction, the punishment imposed
by our hypothetical statute would be an unconstitutional violation of the personal
guilt requirement.109
Alternatively, however, we could view the personal guilt requirement as granting
a much more limited right: the right not to be punished for another’s conduct if the
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Viewing the right this way, the law itself would be almost a peripheral concern.
Instead of looking at the basis of punishment under the statute, a court tasked with
resolving Avon’s challenge would, to use one oft-cited definition of an as-applied
challenge, “‘ask[ ] simply whether the challenger’s activities are protected.’”111  If
the right were characterized in this fashion, Avon would be out of luck as his con-
spiratorial relationship with D’Angelo indisputably puts that relationship well within
the constitutional reach of the criminal law.112  Only a relative who was not involved
in Avon and D’Angelo’s drug conspiracy would be able to successfully challenge a
conviction under the “immediate family member” law.113
As this discussion demonstrates, the status of our hypothetical statute would
depend on the nature of the constitutional right against punishment in the absence of
personal guilt.  If the right meant that the government could not punish someone on
the basis of having a non-criminal relationship, such as a friendship or family relation-
ship, with someone who has committed a crime, then the law would be incapable of
a single constitutional application.  If, however, the right meant only that an individual
could not be punished for another’s crimes unless he had a non-tenuous relationship
with those crimes, there would be many constitutional applications of the law.
Which view of the personal guilt requirement is the better one?  Whatever the best
approach is, it would seem that the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges would
be an unhelpful distraction to reaching an answer.  After all, either outcome in the
hypothetical scenario above would be entirely consistent with the letter of Salerno’s
“no set of circumstances” test.  Instead, the answer presumably should  turn on which
approach would most faithfully implement the underlying constitutional protection.
On this view, facial and as-applied challenges doctrine would be agnostic on substan-
tive constitutional law and would at most govern the severability of constitutional
applications in a statute when a court finds a constitutional violation.114
As discussed above, however, courts have at times appeared to treat the presump-
tion in favor of as-applied challenges as a presumption or rule about the nature of all
constitutional rights.115  Specifically, some courts seem to have implied that they view
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required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’”) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila.
S.S. Co., v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
116 See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180 (4th Cir.
2009) (holding that doctor had no standing to bring an as-applied challenge to Virginia’s ban
on partial-birth abortion because he could not allege specific conduct or patients to which the
ban had been applied).
117 Dorf, supra note 1, at 244–45.
118 Adler, supra note 57, at 33 (“[C]onstitutional rights are not act-shielding.”).
119 Gans, supra note 5, at 1341.
120 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 82 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Even
assuming (as the Justices in the majority do, but I do not) that a law requiring obedience to
a dispersal order is impermissibly vague unless it is clear to the objects of the order, before
its issuance, that their conduct justifies it, I find it hard to believe that the Jets would not have
known they had it coming. That should settle the matter of respondents’ facial challenge to
the ordinance’s vagueness.”).
121 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988)
(arguing that courts employ prophylactic rules in a number of settings to secure constitutional
rights).
122 See Isserles, supra note 3, at 440–41 (“[W]ith one curious exception, all of the Court’s
notable decisions invalidating statutes on the grounds of illegitimate governmental purpose
have been facial invalidations.”).
the presumption in favor of as-applied challenges to mean that constitutional rights
are conduct-oriented rights.116  Thus, one might argue that the presumption in favor
of as-applied challenges should mean that constitutional rights protect only individual
conduct or action and, to resolve constitutional challenges, courts should engage in
a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the conduct at issue was constitutionally
“protected.”  Protected conduct would be immune from government regulation under
any and all circumstances.  Unprotected conduct, by contrast, could be regulated under
any and all applicable laws.  A statute would have constitutional applications—and
accordingly be immune from facial invalidation—if some of the conduct regulated
by the statute was not itself constitutionally protected.  Michael Dorf has referred
to this view of constitutional rights and adjudication as a “privileged-conduct-only
rule”117 and Matthew Adler as an “act-shielding” structure of rights.118  The effect of
the approach would be to “prohibit[ ] courts from invalidating a statute on its face
because invalidation is a better means of implementing the Constitution than case-
by-case adjudication.”119  As discussed above, this conduct-oriented view of constitu-
tional rights was at the heart of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morales.  Recall that there
Scalia stated, and even the Justices in the majority seemed to agree, that the Chicago
anti-loitering ordinance had constitutional applications simply because it encom-
passed conduct that would be within the city’s constitutional power to prohibit under
a different ordinance.120
The trouble with adopting a universally applicable rule about the nature of con-
stitutional rights like the conduct-oriented view is that it is at odds with the way courts
treat a variety of constitutional rights.121  Perhaps the most obvious examples are con-
stitutional doctrines that look to legislative purpose.122  Under purpose-based rules
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123 Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1785
(2008).
124 See Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial
Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2007) (providing an overview of some of the areas where
the court has employed a purpose-based test to enforce constitutional provisions).
125 See, e.g., Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1044–45 (11th Cir.
2008) (explaining the established rule that courts should hold an otherwise valid statute un-
constitutional if racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the enactment
of the law).
126 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(striking down an ordinance that regulated animal slaughter under the Free Exercise Clause
because “[t]he record . . . compel[led] the conclusion that suppression of the central element of
the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances”); see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding unconstitutional an amendment to the Food Stamp
Act that denied food stamps to households composed of unrelated persons on the grounds that
its purpose was to prevent hippies from participating in the program); Nelson, supra note 123,
at 1861–71 (discussing the relationship between improper legislative purpose and the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine).
127 See Adler, supra note 57, at 26–29 (explaining the Equal Protection Clause “discrimi-
natory purpose” rule and noting that it does not protect individual actions but instead grants
a right to be free from impermissible government statutes).
128 Dorf, supra note 1, at 279.
129 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 123, at 1876–79 (“[T]he rise of purpose tests in a par-
ticular area of constitutional law will correlate with the rise of facial challenges in that area.
This linkage may help account for some of the alleged mismatch between the Court’s rhetoric
about the rarity of successful facial challenges and the Court’s actual practices.”).
130 Indeed, while purpose-based rules often result in the invalidation of a statute in its
entirety, they can also give rise to as-applied challenges where the improper purpose is attrib-
utable to the government actor implementing the law and not the one that adopted it. A prime
example here is the law of vindictive prosecution, which prevents criminal prosecutions under
otherwise valid statutes if the prosecution is pursued because of an improper motive. The
doctrine prevents the government from adding new charges after a conviction to retaliate
“[s]tatutes that seem innocuous on their face will nonetheless be held unconstitutional
if the court concludes that the legislature enacted them” for an impermissible reason.123
Courts have adopted purpose-based limits on legislative action as a means of imple-
menting a variety of constitutional rights,124 from the Equal Protection Clause125 to Free
Exercise Clause.126  Of course, by definition, constitutional rules focused on legislative
purpose grant rights that do not depend upon the protected status of a litigant’s own
conduct.  This is because purpose-based rules give individuals the constitutional right
not to be targeted by the government for the wrong reasons.127  If a particular statute
was enacted for an invalid reason, the deficiency will “pervade[ ] all of the provision’s
applications”128 and the statute will have no constitutional applications.
It is not surprising, then, that the improper purpose doctrine is often cited as a
counter-example to the claim that facial challenges are “infrequent.”129  The key point
for our purposes, however, is not that purpose-based restrictions inevitably lead to
“facial challenges” to statutes130 or that they might conflict with Salerno, but that
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against a defendant for a successful appeal or to discourage the defendant from exercising
his right to free speech. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (holding that the
imposition of a more severe sentence after retrial must be supported by the record and not
be based on the prosecutor’s vindictiveness); United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853
(10th Cir. 1992) (“[A] prosecution motivated by a desire to discourage expression protected
by the First Amendment is barred and must be . . . dismissed, irrespective of whether the chal-
lenged action could possibly be found to be unlawful.”). Even if there is sufficient evidence
to sustain the charges, courts have found that the constitution grants defendants a right not to
be targeted for additional punishment for an impermissible reason. United States v. DeMarco,
550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) (“[The rule] prevent[s] chilling the exercise of [constitutional]
rights by other defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the
future.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
131 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
132 Id. at 580.
133 Id. at 561.
134 Id. at 567.
135 Brief for the United States at 15, Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260).
they are irreconcilable with the view that the constitution only grants rights to indi-
viduals to engage in certain conduct.  Purpose-based restrictions demonstrate that
the constitution can restrict government action as such and allow litigants to succeed
in a constitutional challenge to one statute even if their conduct could be regulated
under a different statute.
Moreover, constitutional rules that focus on the government’s action rather than
an individual’s conduct are by no means limited to the improper purpose doctrine.
In the context of the Commerce Clause, for example, the Supreme Court held a pro-
vision of the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) unconstitutional on the grounds
that it regulated noncommercial activity, which was outside the scope of Congress’s
authority.131  The provision at issue in United States v. Lopez made gun possession
within 1,000 feet of a school a federal crime.132  The Court struck down the provision
in its entirety, concluding that possession of a gun in a school zone was an act that “by
its terms ha[d] nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms.”133  The constitutional problem was
not that Lopez’s conduct in the case was somehow immune from all federal regulation,
but that he had a right not to be punished under a statute that made engaging in non-
commercial activity, which the federal government did not have the authority to regu-
late, the sole basis for punishment.134  Indeed, although the Court did not discuss the
issue, the federal government almost surely could have criminalized Lopez’s own con-
duct under a more narrow statute.  This is because Lopez was not simply in possession
of a firearm.  He had taken the weapon to school with him in order to sell it to some-
one else.135  Congress surely has the power to regulate possession with the intent to
distribute—a “commercial” activity—under the Court’s Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence and, as Lopez’s actions make clear, plenty of individuals who were engaged in
that type of conduct fell under the GFSZA’s reach.  But, this does not mean that apply-
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136 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
137 Id. at 561–62; see also Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence
Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1154 (2003) (arguing that enumerated
powers such as “the Commerce Clause state[ ] a condition for the validity of legislation, rather
than stating a test for the validity of the application of Congress’s will to particular sets of
circumstances”).
138 Gans, supra note 5, at 1373–78 (discussing excessive discretion in the Establishment
Clause context). Constitutional doctrines that prohibit giving officials excessive discretion
are, of course, not limited to the Establishment Clause context. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145, 152 (1965). In that case, the Court struck down a voting law that “practi-
cally place[d] [a government official’s] decision[s] beyond the pale of judicial review [because]
he can enfranchise and disfranchise voters at his own sweet will and pleasure without let or
hindrance.” Id.
139 See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 497 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Our normal practice is to assess ex ante the
ing the GFSZA to someone who had possessed a gun with the intent to distribute it
was necessarily constitutional because that is not what the statute prohibited.  It pro-
vided for punishment based on the mere act of possession, which the Court found to
be an unconstitutional basis for federal regulation.136  Accordingly, the law as it was
written could not be constitutionally applied to anyone.  As the Court explained, a
similar law that “limit[ed] its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that addi-
tionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce” might have
been constitutional, but the GFSZA did not have a “jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce.”137  Interestingly, none of the Lopez opinions so much
as mentioned the terms “facial” or “as-applied” challenges.
Examples of other doctrines that focus on the validity of the government’s
action or the terms of the statute (rather than on the defendant’s conduct) include the
Establishment Clause’s prohibition against laws that grant too much discretion in
government officials to advance religion138 and, of course, the First Amendment’s
overbreadth rule against laws that have a “chilling effect” on free speech.139  Indeed,
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risk that a standard will have an impermissible chilling effect on First Amendment protected
speech.”).
140 See generally Adler, supra note 57 (arguing that all rights are “rights against rules”);
see also Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 43 (2009) (arguing that “many if not most structural rights would not be enforceable in the
absence of the free availability of facial challenges to statutes that infringe those rights”).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added); see also Dorf, supra note 1, at 248 (observing
that the First Amendment and the Supremacy Clause both “direct[ ] courts to focus on the
constitutionality of a challenged statute rather than on the privileged or unprivileged character
of the conduct of the litigant challenging it”).
143 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
144 Id. at 218–19.
145 Id. at 220–21, 236.
146 Id. at 220. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (“We have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”); id. at 885–86 (“[A] private
right to ignore generally applicable laws . . . is a constitutional anomaly.”); Adler, supra note
57, at 37–38 n.144 (arguing that the case did not necessarily recognize an “act-shielding” right
because it left “open the possibility that [a different result would be reached] for the very same
contrary to some of the traditional descriptions of facial and as-applied challenges,
the fact that many constitutional provisions do not shield individual conduct from all
laws and instead give rights-holders protection only against constitutionally flawed
government action should not be surprising.  After all, much of the Constitution
focuses attention on the constitutionality of government action rather than the status
of individual conduct.140  The Fourth Amendment, for example, describes “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” but the right
is only good against a specific type of government action, namely, “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”141  Even the First Amendment does not direct itself primarily
toward individual conduct, but provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech.”142
My intention in raising these examples, however, is not to make a broad claim
about the nature of constitutional rights.  Indeed, while many constitutional protec-
tions are not conduct oriented and focus on government action, in some contexts, the
Court appears to have interpreted constitutional provisions as granting rights privi-
leging specific individual conduct.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,143 for example, the Supreme
Court held that a mandatory school attendance policy could not constitutionally be
applied to Amish parents who, for religious reasons, kept their children out of school
after the eighth grade.144  There was no constitutional deficiency in the statute itself
or any of its provisions, nor was there any allegation of discriminatory enforcement.145
The Court, however, held that the Amish litigant’s religious beliefs constituted an
“area[ ] of conduct . . . beyond the power of the State to control, even under regula-
tions of general applicability.”146
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action pursuant to another neutral rule”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120–21 (1990) (discussing the relationship
between the Smith and Yoder decisions).
147 Cf. David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases:
Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 631, 658 (2009) (“The choice of frame of reference, like questions regarding
the reach of ‘free speech’ in the First Amendment or the meaning of ‘equal protection’ in the
Fourteenth Amendment, must depend on the text of the Constitution and the sundry authorities
regularly relied upon for gleaning the text’s meaning.”).
148 There is dispute about whether severability is best conceived as an interpretive or
remedial doctrine. See Gans, supra note 12, at 642 (discussing this debate). In a recent article,
David Gans persuasively argues the case for treating severability as a remedial doctrine, noting
that “[i]t asks a remedial question about the scope of the relief a court should order, not an
interpretive question about the statute’s meaning.” Id. at 643; see also id. at 656–62 (arguing
that severability is a remedial doctrine). My critique of viewing the facial and as-applied
challenges distinction as a method for understanding the law of severability is not affected by
the remedial versus interpretive question. Thus, for the sake of simplicity and ease of differ-
entiating facial and as-applied challenges doctrine as a concept of severability versus a con-
cept of substantive constitutional law, this Article refers to and discusses severability as a
remedial doctrine.
Again, my goal here is not to advance one particular view of constitutional rights
by dismissing the possibility of conduct-oriented rights.  What the foregoing discussion
is meant to show is that the “doctrine” of facial and as-applied challenges is entirely
unhelpful to the project of interpreting the constitution and implementing its pro-
tections through constitutional rules and doctrine.  Salerno’s dictate that a statute be
unconstitutional in every application for it to be unconstitutional “on its face,” along
with similar formulations of the preference for as-applied challenges, simply begs the
question of how we define the constitutional protection and doctrine at issue and what
it means for a law to be unconstitutional in each application.  The facial and as-applied
concepts are incapable of answering this question; only the text and interpretation
of the relevant constitutional provision can provide an answer.147  Any doctrine of
facial and as-applied challenges that claims to guide the Court’s implementation of
constitutional protections will face this same insurmountable problem.
B. Facial and As-Applied Challenges as a Remedial Doctrine?
Of course, just because the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
cannot help guide the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of constitutional rights,
it does not follow that the categories are necessarily useless.  The law of facial and as-
applied challenges might still be intelligible as a doctrine of constitutional remedy.148
On this view, the presumption in favor of as-applied challenges would be agnostic
about the scope of constitutional rights.  Instead, it would govern remedial decisions
by, for example, requiring courts to “sever” a statute any time it had both constitu-
tional and unconstitutional applications.  As discussed above, a number of scholars
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149 See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text.
150 Gans, supra note 12, at 641 (“As Booker powerfully illustrates, severing an invalid
provision or application from a complex statute does more than simply remove it; it simul-
taneously changes the underlying statutory scheme.”).
151 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result) (“Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial
alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the
class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to
include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.”). But see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 325 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that while a court may strike pro-
visions through severability, “it may not proceed ‘by inserting [applications] that are not now
there’” (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876))).
have taken the view that questions about the use of facial and as-applied challenges
can generally be reduced to questions about remedying constitutional violations.149
With respect to severability, the facial and as-applied categories have at least some rele-
vance to the task at hand.  After all, the categories describe, and the remedial decision
determines, the fate of a statute with unconstitutional applications.  But, once again,
the facial and as-applied distinction and its simplistic presumption in favor of as-
applied challenges are ultimately unhelpful.  This is because the facial and as-applied
dichotomy assumes that courts have only two options to address a statute with uncon-
stitutional applications: either strike the law down in its entirety or sever the parts of
the law with unconstitutional applications from those with constitutional applications.
This assumption is problematic because most difficult severability problems involve
many different options for remedying the law’s constitutional deficiency.  Similarly,
in some instances severing the provisions that involve unconstitutional applications
may significantly alter the entire law in other ways.150  Courts faced with these sev-
erability questions must choose between altering the law (and in what way) or scrap-
ping the law entirely.  Arguably in some circumstances, courts may even consider
adding to the reach of a law explicitly or implicitly to cure a constitutional problem
in a statute.151  The facial and as-applied challenges categories do little to inform these
issues and, as a result, add nothing to the law of severability.
To begin to see why this is so, consider a hypothetical statute that makes it a crime
“to conspire with a family member.”  Unlike our hypothetical law criminalizing “being
an immediate family member of a person who commits a felony,” this new law incor-
porates an element of personal guilt into the statute itself.  But, it also makes family
status a basis of punishment.  Assuming that this aspect of the law was constitutionally
problematic, what would be the appropriate solution?  On the one hand, arguably all
of the statute’s applications would be unconstitutional because all would involve the
prohibited use of family status.  On the other, this constitutional deficiency could be
efficiently addressed by excising the “with a family member” language from the law.
But, while redrawing the statute to eliminate unconstitutional applications would be
easy as a technical matter, it would result in a completely different law than the legis-
lature enacted.  Which result would the presumption in favor of as-applied challenges
2010] MAKING SENSE OF FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 683
152 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
153 See id. at 262.
154 Id. at 237–39.
155 Id. at 239–40.
156 Id. at 240–46.
157 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court also considered, and rejected, Vermont’s argument that
Buckley should be overruled. Randall, 548 U.S. at 243.
158 Randall, 548 U.S. at 256.
159 Id. at 261. In addition to these two reasons, the Court found that the overall impact of
the limits on the ability of challengers to raise enough funds to wage a competitive campaign,
the Act’s failure to exempt the out-of-pocket expenses of volunteers from the contribution limit,
and the absence of a special justification for such tight restrictions in the record (such as, for
example, evidence that Vermont has an especially serious corruption problem as compared to
other states) were all factors that, taken together, made the contributions limit unconstitutional.
Id. at 253–62.
require?  Would the analysis change if the jurisdiction also already made simple con-
spiracy a crime but with a less severe punishment than for the crime of conspiring with
a family member?
The 2006 case Randall v. Sorrell152 illustrates in greater detail why the facial and
as-applied challenges categories cannot provide a basis for a coherent remedial doc-
trine.  In Randall, the Supreme Court struck down Vermont’s campaign contribution
limits scheme in its entirety even though Justice Breyer, in his opinion for the
plurality, indicated that it might have been possible for the Court to address the
law’s constitutional flaws by severing certain provisions and leaving other parts of
the law intact.153  The contribution limits system at issue in Randall was part of a
broader 1997 Vermont campaign finance law that also limited campaign expendi-
tures, provided for disclosure and reporting requirements, and created a voluntary
public financing system for gubernatorial races.154  A group of politicians, voters,
and political parties challenged the expenditure and contribution limits aspects of
the law on First Amendment grounds.155  With respect to the expenditure limits, the
Court found that the limits were unconstitutional in their entirety156 under the
seminal 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo.157  The contribution limits presented a more
difficult question but the Court held that they too violated the First Amendment
citing, among other factors, the impact that the restriction on contributions by
political parties would have on “the right to associate in a political party”158 and the
law’s failure to index contribution limits to adjust for inflation.159
In light of these determinations, the Court had at least three possible avenues to
remedy the constitutional defects: (1) strike down the Vermont campaign finance law
as a whole (including the unchallenged reporting and disclosure provisions), (2) strike
down as little of the law as possible, meaning the expenditure limits and some pro-
visions of the contribution limits, or (3) strike down both the expenditure and con-
tribution limits in their entirety but leave the other aspects of the law untouched.  The
Court discussed the question of remedy only briefly, limiting its analysis to the second
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160 Id. at 262.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. By comparison, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court decided to sever unconstitutional
restrictions on campaign spending from the rest of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 424
U.S. 1, 108–09 (1976). This result has been criticized for resulting in an ill-considered system.
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 407 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“[The campaign finance system’s] unhappy origins are in our earlier decree in Buckley, which
by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting
expenditures) created a misshapen system . . . .”).
164 See John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 218–21 (1993) (discussing
the history of the presumption in favor of severability and noting that while there have been
some periods of confusion and dispute, the Court generally has embraced a presumption in
favor of severability); see also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945,
1961 (1997) (“When the Court applies a presumption of severability, however, it presumes
that Congress intends its statutes to take effect to the maximum extent that the Constitution
permits.”).
and third options.160  It found that severing some of the law’s contribution limits
provisions was not a realistic option because “[t]o sever provisions to avoid con-
stitutional objection here would require us to write words into the statute (inflation
indexing), or to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions).”161  In addi-
tion, the Court observed, there were a number of different ways in which the Vermont
Legislature could address its constitutional objections.162  Accordingly, it concluded
that the “Vermont Legislature would have intended us to set aside the statute’s con-
tribution limits, leaving the legislature free to rewrite those provisions in light of the
constitutional difficulties we have identified.”163
One thing was glaringly absent from the Court’s remedial analysis: the presump-
tion in favor of as-applied challenges.  Indeed, none of the opinions even so much as
mentioned the terms “as-applied” or “facial” challenge.  The omission might seem
surprising given the trend toward viewing the presumption in favor of as-applied
challenges as primarily concerned with severability.  But, when one considers the
Randall Court’s options for remedying the First Amendment problems in Vermont’s
law, it quickly becomes clear that the facial and as-applied challenges categories
would have been of little value.  The most that could be said for how the facial and
as-applied challenges doctrine might have applied in Randall is that it should have led
the Court to more seriously consider the path of leaving as much of the contributions
limits scheme as possible intact.  It is not clear, however, how this reading would
differ from the long-standing presumption that statutes should be severed where
possible.164  Perhaps more to the point, the problems facing the Randall Court were
ones that a presumption in favor of severability or as-applied challenges could not
help solve—namely, that following the presumption in favor of severability in the case
of the Vermont contribution limits scheme would have dramatically altered the statute
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165 See Randall, 548 U.S. at 262 (describing difficulties with severing the unconstitutional
provisions of the state campaign expenditure law).
166 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999)
(“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into legislative
intent.”); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)
(“Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what
is left is fully operative as a law.”); see also Nagle, supra note 164, at 204–06 (providing a
history of the doctrine of severability and the role of legislative intent in severability deter-
minations). In a recent article, David Gans makes a compelling argument against the current
practice of focusing on legislative intent in addressing severability questions and arguing that
courts should be more restrained in severing statutes and less hesitant to strike them down in
their entirety. See Gans, supra note 12, at 669 (“In short, we need to develop a better sever-
ability doctrine—one that puts effective limits on the authority of courts to rewrite statutes.”).
and required the Court to choose between many different options about which parts
of the law to sever.165
The facial and as-applied challenges categories, which present severability as
an either-or option, are inherently incapable of guiding decisions about these types
of questions.  They do not help answer tough severability problems, such as how to
balance the interest in severability against the prospect of dramatically altering a statute,
or how to choose between different options when there is more than one way to elimi-
nate a statute’s unconstitutional applications.  Instead, under the Court’s precedent,
difficult severability questions are guided by considering legislative intent, which is
viewed as the central principle of severability analysis.166  Regardless of whether one
thinks legislative intent is a wise test or whether some other principle should serve
as the touchstone of severability analysis, the facial and as-applied challenges cate-
gories are incapable of offering a helpful alternative.  They may be able to describe
the outcome after a court has decided whether to “sever” a law with unconstitutional
applications, but they do nothing to help tell the court how to make that decision.
III. WHY THE FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES CATEGORIES DO MORE
HARM THAN GOOD
In the previous sections, I have argued that the law of facial and as-applied
challenges is fundamentally incoherent.  As it stands today, even the most basic
question of whether the preference for as-applied challenges relates to the interpre-
tation of constitutional rights, severability, or a mixture between the two, remains
unanswered.  And, as I have claimed, the problem is not that the categories have been
poorly defined, but that they are naturally refractory to being governed by a single
inquiry or set of rules.
If this is so, one understandably might wonder what should be made of the Court’s
decisions debating faithfulness to the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine.  Why
do Justices from across the ideological spectrum continue to rely on it if the factors
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167 See supra notes 18–42 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 24–42 and accompanying text.
169 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
170 Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
171 Id. at 871.
172 Id. at 846 (majority opinion) (“[T]he right of [a] woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State [is reaffirmed].”).
173 Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
that distinguish facial from as-applied challenges are still so unclear?  And, if the doc-
trine is truly useless, what impact if any does it have in cases where it is employed?
As this section will show, the “doctrine” of facial and as-applied challenges turns out
to be nothing more than a rhetorical device to help bolster a decision that actually turns
on other considerations.  The presumption in favor of as-applied challenges is especially
appealing to a Justice who would like to see a narrower constitutional rule or remedy
applied in the case at hand because the as-applied presumption offers the veneer of an
ideologically neutral, process-oriented doctrine that applies across all areas of con-
stitutional law.  Moreover, precisely because the doctrine is so poorly defined and
malleable, it can be used to support a narrower outcome in almost any circumstance.
More important and problematic, however, is the impact that it has on the cases
in which it is employed.  In this section, I argue that the Court’s reliance on facial
and as-applied challenges doctrine is more than just unhelpful—it is a harmful dis-
traction that leads to a lack of clarity in the law and an artificial preference for con-
strained definitions of constitutional rights.
To see why this is so, let’s begin by returning to the abortion decisions discussed
at the beginning of this Article.167  Perhaps the most sustained and well-known debate
about the proper use of facial and as-applied challenges has occurred in the area of the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  Nevertheless, after years of back-and-forth, the rela-
tionship between facial and as-applied challenges and abortion rights remains un-
clear at even the most fundamental level.  Recall, for example, that in the span of two
years, the Supreme Court issued one decision, Ayotte, that framed the “facial” and “as-
applied” distinction as a remedial doctrine to be employed once a constitutional vio-
lation has been found and another decision, Carhart, that treated the categories as
informing the constitutional standard for assessing the merits of a litigant’s claim.168
The interaction between the facial and as-applied categories and the scope and
meaning of the governing constitutional rule for abortion challenges has been at the
heart of this confusion.  Since the seminal 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,169 the Court has subjected regulations of pre-
viability abortions to an “undue burden” test.170  Under this framework, a woman has
a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before viability.171  Thus, the state may
not prohibit pre-viability abortions.172  It may, however, regulate pre-viability abor-
tions so long as the regulations do not impose an “undue burden” upon the right to an
abortion.173  “An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if
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174 Id; see also id. at 877 (“Regulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect
for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
exercise of the right to choose.”).
175 Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)).
176 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). For a pre-Casey example, see Fargo
Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) (discussing lower court opinion that granted summary judgment in a challenge
to an abortion statute by relying on Salerno).
177 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
178 Id.
179 See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); Fargo
Women’s Health, 507 U.S. at 1013.
180 See Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1177–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
181 Fargo Women’s Health, 507 U.S. at 1014 (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial of cer-
tiorari). Meanwhile, Justice Stevens argued that Salerno’s standard for facial challenges was
dicta. Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1174 (Stevens, J., memorandum respecting denial of certiorari).
Adding to the confusion, in a later case outside of the abortion context, Justice Souter, in an
opinion joined by five other Justices, described the abortion undue burden standard as an ex-
its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”174  After viability, the government may
“‘proscribe[ ] abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’”175
Not long after Casey announced the undue burden standard, lower courts began
to struggle with its relationship to Salerno’s “rule” that a facial challenge can suc-
ceed only if “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”176
The root of the apparent tension between the two cases was the Casey Court’s expla-
nation for striking down one of the provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute:
“[I]n a large fraction of the cases in which [the provision] is relevant, it will operate
as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”177  This seemed
to be fundamentally at odds with Salerno’s dictate.  After all, if the law presents an
undue burden in only “a large fraction” of cases,178 then there must be some cases in
which it does not pose an undue burden, and therefore, there are some circumstances
in which the law could constitutionally be applied.
The Supreme Court waded into the subject in a handful of opinions accompany-
ing denials of certiorari.  In these opinions, the Justices debated whether Salerno or
Casey provided the controlling standard in the context of abortion cases.179  Justice
Scalia, accompanied by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that
Salerno governed all facial challenges and meant that courts could not strike down
abortion laws in their entirety on the basis that they posed an undue burden in a “large
fraction” of cases.180  On the other side, Justices O’Connor and Souter did not disagree
that the standards were in conflict but took the view that the Casey standard now gov-
erned facial challenges in abortion cases.181  So, although the Justices have debated
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ample of an instance where the Court had “recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging
overbreadth” as an exception to Salerno’s rule. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10
(2004); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (noting the debate about the
standard for facial challenges to abortion statutes but concluding, “[w]e need not resolve that
debate”); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[S]even circuits have concluded that Salerno does not govern facial challenges to abortion
regulations. . . . Only the Fifth Circuit has suggested otherwise.”).
182 See, e.g., Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1179 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(characterizing the apparent conflict between Salerno and Casey as presenting the issue
“what is the standard for a challenge to the facial constitutionality of an abortion law?”).
183 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
184 Id. at 1615.
185 Id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. (“Weighing the burden
the relationship between Salerno and Casey, they have all characterized the question
as an issue of which case governs the constitutional rule for challenges to abortion
laws.182  This is a striking example of the view that the facial and as-applied challenges
doctrine controls substantive constitutional rules across all areas of constitutional
law.  On this view, if Salerno were controlling, challenges to abortion statutes would
not be governed by substantive due process doctrine, but by a universally applicable
facial and as-applied challenges rule.
On closer inspection, however, the apparent conflict between Salerno’s “no set
of circumstances” rule and Casey’s undue burden test becomes illusory.  Just as we
saw in the context of vagueness in Morales and the hypothetical law criminalizing
being “an immediate family member of a person who commits a felony,” there is only
a conflict if one first accepts a “privileged conduct” view of constitutional rights.  The
conclusion that Casey and Salerno are inconsistent with one another is premised on
the assumption that the undue burden test means that each woman seeking an abortion
has an individual right not to be unduly burdened by government regulation.  Once
one makes that assumption, then unless a law burdens each and every woman who
may possibly fall under its reach, Salerno’s supposed standard would prevent a facial
challenge.  An equally plausible view, however, is that Casey’s undue burden test
has nothing to do with burdens on particular individuals but rather sets a standard
for legislative action.
Ironically, Justice Scalia himself adopted this view of an undue burden test in
2008, albeit in the context of the right to vote.  In Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, the Court considered a challenge to an Indiana law that required citizens to
present photo identification in order to vote.183  The lead opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens, upheld the law, finding that “the evidence in the record is not sufficient
to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute,”184 but held open the
possibility of a later challenge.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
concurred in the judgment, but argued that the Court should have foreclosed the pos-
sibility of a future challenge to the law on the ground that the constitutional standard
for evaluating voting laws requires a “general assessment of the burden”185 imposed
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of a nondiscriminatory voting law upon each voter . . . would effectively turn back decades
of equal-protection jurisprudence.”).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1625.
188 Id. at 1626–27 (emphasis added).
189 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
190 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women
v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 148 (4th Cir. 2008) (striking down a Virginia abortion statute in
its entirety and explaining that even though “[a] doctor attempting in good faith to comply
with the Virginia Act will accidentally violate the Act in a small fraction of cases . . . the
doctor never knows prior to embarking on [the] procedure whether a violation will occur.
Thus, every time a doctor sets out to perform [the procedure], he faces the unavoidable risk
of criminal prosecution”).
191 Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
192 Compare, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 179 (4th Cir.
2009) (“[The] rare circumstance where a fetus accidentally emerges to an anatomical landmark
intact and alive and its head then becomes lodged in the cervix . . . does not justify rendering
invalid the Virginia Act for all other circumstances.”), with id. at 195 (Michael, J., dissenting)
(“The majority considers how often a standard D&E becomes an accidental intact D&E,
when the critical question is how often (and whether) the Virginia Act imposes a burden on
a woman’s ability to obtain a (pre-viability) standard D&E abortion. . . . The record here
establishes that the Virginia Act threatens criminal liability—and thus imposes a burden—in
by the law, and does not permit “an individual-focused” or “case-by-case approach.”186
As Justice Scalia explained, although a voting law will “affect[ ] different voters
differently,” the question of whether it imposes an unconstitutional burden should
be answered in the abstract because what some may characterize as individual burdens
“are no more than the different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly
imposes on all voters.”187  Thus, the relevant question is whether the law “imposes a
severe and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote.”188
Justice Scalia did not discuss facial and as-applied challenges in his Crawford
concurrence.  But, it is easy to see that if one adopts this view of the undue burden
standard, the supposed conflict with Salerno disappears.  If a law imposes an overall
undue burden on the right at issue—for example, by burdening a “large fraction of
cases” in the parlance of Casey189—it will fail the test.  And, by definition, there will
be “no set of circumstances . . . under which the Act would be valid.”190  For this same
reason, Salerno and Casey are only “inconsistent” if one takes the view (rejected by
Scalia in Crawford) that “individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity
of the burden” and “a single plaintiff” could succeed by claiming “a severe burden”
in their case.191
As this discussion demonstrates, the determinative question about the scope of
Casey’s undue burden test is not, and should not be, its relationship to the principles
of facial and as-applied challenges.  After all, the existence of a conflict between an
undue burden test and the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine depends entirely
on how one defines the undue burden test.192  Instead, courts should be asking which
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every case that calls for a standard D&E.”).
193 Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1626; see also Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d at 196 (Michael,
J., dissenting) (“There is simply insufficient time in an individual case to pose an as-applied
challenge to a statute regulating abortion.”). For an argument in favor of an “individual-right/
practical-barrier” model in the context of voting rights burden cases, see Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory
of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 659–67 (2008) (discussing some of the
attractive qualities of an individual-right oriented view of the undue burden standard for
voting rights).
194 Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process after Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1517, 1521 (2008) (“If Justice Kennedy sticks with an insistence on as applied over
facial challenges in future substantive due process cases, there will be a whole lot fewer new
constitutional rights that will be found either by the Supreme Court or by lower federal and
state courts relying on the Supreme Court’s loose language.”).
195 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2006)).
view of the test would most faithfully and effectively implement the constitutional
right.  And, as Crawford demonstrates, there is no single universally applicable
standard for defining the scope and substance of constitutional rules.  Rather, con-
stitutional rules and tests are derived on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis in light of the
constitutional protection at issue.  In his Crawford concurrence, for example, Justice
Scalia argued that a case-by-case approach to weighing the burden would be espe-
cially problematic in the case of voting rights because it “is an area where the dos and
don’ts need to be known in advance of the election, and voter-by-voter examination
of the burdens of voting regulations would prove especially disruptive.”193  In the
context of abortion rights, however, discussion of these issues has been pushed to the
side by an irrelevant debate about Salerno.  As a result, the intense focus on the facial
and as-applied challenges categories has only served to confuse and obfuscate the
issues that are truly important.  Similarly, it has created an artificial and unsupported
impression that a robust constitutional standard that tests statutes based on their overall
burden is an anomaly that is inconsistent with the non-ideological and structural norms
of facial and as-applied challenges.194
The point here, of course, is not that one view of the undue burden standard is
better than the other.  It is that the facial and as-applied challenges categories do not
present a principled basis for defining constitutional protections.  The Court should
define constitutional rules based on the constitutional protection at issue.  Yet, Justices
on both sides of the ideological spectrum continue to rely on the facial and as-applied
challenges categories to support narrower constitutional rules.
This brings us back to the Court’s most recent abortion decision, Carhart, which
limited the scope of the rule that the government cannot ban an abortion procedure
that is “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the . . .
health of the mother.”195  The year before Carhart, in Ayotte, the Court applied the
health exception rule to a New Hampshire statute that prohibited doctors from per-
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196 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
197 Id. at 327–28.
198 Id. at 330 (“After finding an application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must
next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”);
id. at 331 (discussing severability clause).
199 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But the Court offers no clue on what a ‘proper’
lawsuit might look like.”).
202 Id.
203 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000).
204 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.
205 Cf. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 197 (4th Cir. 2009).
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“This evidence will be no different if Dr. Fitzhugh is forced to file
another lawsuit.”). For an argument in support of Kennedy’s approach to as-applied challenges
in this area, see Kevin C. Walsh, Frames of Reference and the “Turn to Remedy” in Facial
Challenge Doctrine, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667, 669 (2009) (“Although certain particu-
lars of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court are confounding, its insistence on as-applied
adjudication going forward is entirely appropriate for establishing discrete health-based
exceptions to the general partial-birth abortion ban.”).
forming an abortion on a minor until forty-eight hours after delivering written noti-
fication to the minor’s parents.196  There, New Hampshire conceded that the Act had
unconstitutional applications because it would prevent a minor from obtaining an
immediate abortion even in situations where it was medically necessary for her
health.197  The Court unanimously held that this deficiency did not necessarily re-
quire total invalidation of the law, treating the as-applied challenges presumption as
a severability doctrine.198  In Carhart, by contrast, the Court relied on the facial and
as-applied challenges categories to help define the content of the health exception
rule.  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy argued that “facial attacks” to the
Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 “should not have been entertained
in the first instance.”199  Instead, he concluded that as-applied challenges were “the
proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete
and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the
procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.”200  Kennedy did not elaborate on this
new standard,201 but it appears to require litigants to identify specific and narrow med-
ical circumstances in which a banned procedure would be medically necessary in
order to meet the health exception requirement.202
Prior to Carhart, the Court’s constitutional rule dictated that a health exception
was required if there was “substantial medical authority” to show that banning the
procedure at issue “could endanger women’s health.”203  If a law failed this standard,
then, as discussed in Ayotte, a court could enjoin its application to instances where the
procedure was determined to be medically necessary.204  Though Justice Kennedy did
not address the issue, presumably a successful challenge under Carhart’s test would
similarly result in an injunction to shield medically necessary procedures.205  Accord-
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206 For recent and insightful arguments on how the Court’s emphasis on facial challenges
has been used to undermine constitutional protections of individual rights, see Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through Facial Challenges,
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 598 (2009) (arguing that the Court has relied on the facial and
as-applied challenges doctrine to “excuse[ ] [itself] from providing predictability and guidance
as to the scope and contours of individual rights”); Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies and Facial
Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 626 (2009) (arguing that “the Roberts Court’s
less than coherent approach to as-applied and facial challenges appears to be yet another
example of the Court’s retreat from substantive protection of individual rights, cloaked in
procedural jargon”).
207 David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and
the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 715 (2009) (“By emphasizing the norms
of judicial modesty that lie at the heart of the traditional model [of facial and as-applied
challenges], the Court can try to soften the blow of an effective overruling, as in Carhart . . . .”).
ingly, under either Carhart’s test or the earlier standard, the Court could remedy a
constitutional violation by applying severability principles to avoid invalidating the
law in its entirety.  In other words, from the perspective of the facial and as-applied
challenges categories—at least assuming they are defined by whether a law is struck
down in its entirety—the two standards appear to be on exactly the same footing.
The only difference between the two rules is that Carhart’s raises the burden
for showing that there has been a constitutional violation in the first place.  Under
Carhart, it is no longer enough to show that there is substantial medical authority that
a health exception is necessary.  A litigant must instead define discrete and specific
circumstances that are likely to occur where the procedure is medically necessary. Re-
gardless of whether this standard is preferable, the facial and as-applied challenges
categories do not justify its adoption.  To be sure, Carhart’s standard is narrower than
the previous rule, but there is no overarching principle of constitutional adjudication
in favor of narrow constitutional rules.  Indeed, it is difficult to envision what a pre-
sumption in favor of narrow constitutional rules would even mean because it would
almost always be possible to adopt an even more narrow rule.  Yet, as Carhart dem-
onstrates, the facial and as-applied challenges distinction provides an easy rhetorical
device to support the adoption of constrained constitutional rules.206
This is problematic because it may lead courts to adopt rules that do not repre-
sent the most faithful implementation of the relevant constitutional protection simply
because the rule is narrow.  It also allows courts to avoid grappling with some of the
more difficult questions that may arise from their holdings.  This is because a court
can cite the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine to reject earlier holdings and
rules without directly confronting inconsistencies or even explaining how the new
standard is different from the old.207  By turning the issue into a question about the
use of facial challenges, a court can say that it is rejecting the “facial” attack, but that
future as-applied challenges may be successful, and then move on without explaining
what a proper “as-applied” challenge would look like.  As Justice Ginsburg observed
in her Carhart dissent, for example, the majority in that case did not foreclose as-
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208 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,189 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 167 (majority opinion).
210 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
211 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380); see David J.
Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 16 (quoting and discussing Justice Kennedy’s remarks during oral argument in Carhart).
212 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, 23, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380).
213 See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
214 For two recent and engaging discussions of facial and as-applied challenges in the con-
text of election law, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied
Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2009) and Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer
S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-
Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1644 (2009).
215 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (discussing the “magic words” standard).
216 See id.
217 See id. at 126–28 (“While the distinction between issue and express advocacy seemed
applied challenges to the federal partial birth law, but it “offer[ed] no clue on what a
‘proper’ [as-applied] lawsuit might look like.”208  Similarly, while the majority argued
that “[i]n an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better quan-
tified and balanced”209—echoing a common argument that as-applied challenges
prevent against the “‘premature interpretatio[n] of statutes’ on the basis of factu-
ally barebones records”210—Carhart involved an extensive factual record, as Justice
Kennedy himself noted in oral argument.211  There, Kennedy wondered aloud: “I read
all the doctors’ testimony in this case, hundreds of pages . . . trying to imagine how
an as applied challenge would be really much different from what we have seen al-
ready.”212  In his Carhart opinion, however, instead of addressing this important and
difficult question, Justice Kennedy simply repeated the convenient but unsupported
maxim that as-applied challenges are the best mechanism for courts to make factual
determinations.213
While the Court’s abortion jurisprudence nicely illustrates how the presumption
in favor of as-applied challenges can be used to provide rhetorical support for narrow
views of constitutional rights, its treatment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002’s (more commonly known as “McCain-Feingold”) ban on corporate and
union “electioneering communications” provides perhaps the clearest example of how
the as-applied and facial challenges doctrine can be used to disregard precedent with-
out actually overruling it.214  Prior to McCain-Feingold, federal campaign finance law
employed the so-called “magic words” standard for regulating corporate and union
advertising.215  If an advertisement used phrases that expressly advocated for the
election or defeat of a candidate, such as “Elect John McCain,” then corporations and
unions could not pay for the ads from their general treasuries.216  All other ads were
considered “issue ads” and thus went unregulated, even though many “issue ads”
were the functional equivalent of a campaign advertisement.217  Among McCain-
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neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important
respects.”); see also Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory
Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1072–74 (2008) (describing
the evolution of the distinction between “issue” advertising and “express advocacy” advertising).
218 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132 (“BCRA’s central provisions are designed to address
Congress’ concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence
federal elections.”).
219 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
220 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
221 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
222 Id. at 190–92.
223 Id.; Hasen, supra note 217, at 1075–76.
224 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 207 (finding that the “plaintiffs [had not] carried their heavy burden of proving
[the electioneering communications provision was] overbroad” because the law’s “application
to pure issue ads” was not “substantial”).
Feingold’s various reforms, it aimed to eliminate what many proponents of campaign
finance regulation considered a loophole for “sham” issue ads.218  Under the law,
corporations and unions could not spend general treasury funds on “electioneering
communication,” which it defined as television advertising that “refer[red] to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office” and aired within “30 days before a primary
or preference election” or “60 days before a general, special, or runoff election.”219
Unions and corporations remained free to create segregated Political Action Committee
(PAC) funds, however, which were subject to federal regulation including disclosure
requirements, in order to run such ads.220
The Court first addressed the McCain-Feingold “electioneering communication”
provision in the 2003 case McConnell v. FEC, as part of a broad-ranging challenge to
numerous aspects of the law.221  There, the plaintiffs argued that the ban on “election-
eering communication” was unconstitutionally overbroad and accordingly invalid in
its entirety.222  They argued that the ban regulated a large amount of “genuine issue
advocacy”—ads that were genuinely focused on legislation or a policy issue and
were unlikely to affect an election but that were, nonetheless, subject to McCain-
Feingold’s bright line rule because they mentioned a federal candidate and were run
shortly before an election.223  A five-Justice majority that included Justice O’Connor
upheld the restriction, finding that “the vast majority of ads” covered by the provision
were “intended to influence the voters’ decisions and ha[d] that effect.”224  Moreover,
the Court explained, any burden on genuine issue ads would be minimal as “corpora-
tions and unions may finance genuine issue ads during [the pre-election] timeframe[ ]
by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases
by paying for the ad from a segregated fund.”225  The opinion left open the possibility
that a future “as-applied” challenge might succeed, however, in the case of “pure”
issue ads.226
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227 551 U.S. 449 (2007). The Court originally heard oral argument in the case just two weeks
before Justice O’Connor retired, following Justice Alito’s confirmation and swearing in. It
issued a brief per curiam opinion six days after the argument remanding the case on the basis
that the district court had erroneously concluded that McConnell foreclosed all as-applied
challenges to the law. Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
228 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 459.
229 See id. at 460.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 469–70. In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the principal opinion’s “reasonable
interpretation” test may be even more restrictive of government regulation than the “magic
words” formula and that “on [its] reasoning it is possible that even some ads with magic
words could not be regulated.” Id. at 526–27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232 See id. at 531(“The Chief Justice thus effectively reinstates the same toothless ‘magic
words’ criterion of regulable electioneering that led Congress to enact BCRA in the first
place.”); Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 2006–2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87 (“[T]he decision goes so far
toward eviscerating § 203 that it effectively overrules McConnell’s holding that the section
is valid on its face.”).
233 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 533.
234 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). For an engaging examination of fallback provisions
generally, see Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303 (2007).
Just four years later, with Justice Alito having filled Justice O’Connor’s seat
after her retirement, the Court appeared to effectively overrule McConnell in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life (hereinafter WRTL).227  In WRTL, the plaintiffs sought to run
advertisements in Wisconsin during the proscribed time period in opposition to the
filibuster of federal judicial nominees that included the sign-off line “Contact Senators
Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster.”228  Because the ads referred
to Senator Feingold, who was a candidate for reelection at the time, they fell within
the “electioneering communication” provision in McCain-Feingold and could only
have been paid for with PAC funds.229  The plaintiffs challenged the application of the
law to their ads.230  Chief Justice Roberts, writing the principal opinion for a fractured
Court, found that the First Amendment allowed only for the regulation of issue ads if
they are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate,” which he labeled “the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.”231  The holding had the effect of overruling McConnell by adopting a rule
that seems largely indistinguishable from the earlier “magic words” test.232
As Justice Souter explained in dissent, to see how Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
“produces the result of overruling McConnell’s holding,” one “need merely ask what
the law would have been if, back in 2003, this Court had held [the McCain-Feingold
electioneering provision] facially unconstitutional.”233  This question is easy to answer
because McCain-Feingold included a fallback provision, to be used in the event the
law’s original “electioneering communication” definition was held unconstitutional.234
The fallback definition of “electioneering communication” was an ad that “attacks
or opposes a candidate for [federal] office (regardless of whether the communication
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235 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii).
236 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. (“This backup
sounds familiar because it is essentially identical to The Chief Justice’s test for evaluating an
as-applied challenge to the original definition of ‘electioneering communication’. . . . There
is neither a theoretical nor a practical basis to claim that McConnell’s treatment of § 203
survives.”).
237 See id. at 498–99 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Indeed, the principal opinion’s attempt
at distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive enough, and the change in the law it works is
substantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent views concern-
ing the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the opinion effectively overrules
McConnell without saying so.”).
238 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 217 (“[I]t is fair to say that the principal opinion in WRTL II
effectively overruled McConnell.”); Michael J. Kasper, Magic Words and Millionaires: The
Supreme Court’s Assault on Campaign Funding, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 19 (“Despite
the niceties of the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, the Court effectively
reversed itself.”).
239 Hasen, supra note 217, at 1086.
240 Wis. Right to Life , 551 U.S. at 464. This portion of the opinion somewhat awkwardly
described the dispute as follows: “Appellants contend that WRTL should be required to dem-
onstrate that BCRA is unconstitutional as applied to the ads. After all, appellants reason,
McConnell already held that BCRA § 203 was facially valid. These cases, however, present
the separate question whether § 203 may constitutionally be applied to these specific ads.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive
of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate.”235  Chief Justice Roberts did not explain whether there was any difference
between the fallback law’s “suggestive of no plausible meaning” definition and his
own “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation” standard.  But it is difficult to
conceive of a case that would meet one but not the other.  This led Justice Souter to
conclude that “the principal opinion institute[s] the very standard that would have
prevailed if the Court formally overruled McConnell.”236
Indeed, seven members of the WRTL Court—three of whom concurred in the
result—believed that the principal opinion effectively overruled McConnell,237 a con-
clusion with which commentators are also in near universal agreement.238  Yet, Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion barely entertains the possibility that it could be at odds with
McConnell.  Instead, it “is written in a lawyerly and sophisticated way to make it
appear as though [the decisions are] consistent.”239  At the heart of this portrayal is
Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on the facial and as-applied challenges categories,
which he used to “distinguish” McConnell by implying that the cases involved two
entirely distinct issues.  As Chief Justice Roberts put it, although “McConnell already
held that BCRA § 203 was facially valid,” the WRTL ads “present the separate ques-
tion whether § 203 may constitutionally be applied to these specific ads.”240  And later,
in Roberts’s attempt to square the WRTL holding with McConnell’s finding that “the
vast majority of ads” covered by the law were not constitutionally protected “genu-
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241 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
242 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 476 n.8.
243 Id.; see also id. (“For the reasons we have explained, ‘purpose’ is not the appropriate test
for distinguishing between genuine issue ads and the functional equivalent of express campaign
advocacy.”). In this footnote, Roberts also advanced an alternative argument based on facial
and as-applied challenges semantics that “the ‘vast majority’ statement was not necessary
to the Court’s facial holding in McConnell” because “[t]he standard required for a statute to
survive an overbreadth challenge is not that the ‘vast majority’ of a statute’s applications be
legitimate.” Id.
244 See Gans, supra note 12, at 656 n.76 (“Framing the case as one concerning the stan-
dard for an as-applied challenge enabled Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion to effectively overrule
McConnell without considering stare decisis.”); see also Metzger, supra note 75, at 797 (noting
that the Roberts’s Court’s facial and as-applied challenges “decisions are notable for their
strategic aspect, with the Court using the facial/as-applied distinction as a mechanism to avoid
directly overruling recent precedent and achieve a majority or unity on a decision”); Geoffrey
R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1533, 1537–38 (2008) (citing WRTL as a case in which “Roberts and Alito abandoned
the principle of stare decisis, and did so in a particularly insidious manner . . . [by] purport[ing]
to respect a precedent while in fact cynically interpreting it into oblivion”).
245 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 499 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“This faux judicial re-
straint is judicial obfuscation.”). Richard Hasen has theorized that Chief Justice Roberts’s likely
motivation for taking this approach was that he “apparently did not want to pay a political cost
for appearing to move too quickly to overturn precedent.” Hasen, supra note 217, at 1091.
246 Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92,
98 (“[The] decision to overrule [McConnell] not explicitly but through a laughably cynical sub-
terfuge, by claiming practically every conceivable issue ad to be an exception to McConnell’s
ban on such ads, is as demeaning to the Court as it is threatening to our democracy.”).
ine issue ads,”241 he explained that “[c]ourts do not resolve unspecified as-applied
challenges in the course of resolving a facial attack, so McConnell could not have
settled the issue we address today.”242  Accordingly, McConnell’s “‘vast majority’
language [was] beside the point” because McConnell had only “found that such ads
had an ‘electioneering purpose’” whereas Roberts’s opinion held that “‘purpose’ is
not the appropriate test for” as-applied challenges.243  Thus, by employing the facial
and as-applied challenges categories, Chief Justice Roberts was able to make an “end
run” around McConnell and avoid having to grapple with principles of stare decisis.244
Stare decisis was a non-issue according to Roberts because McConnell was a “facial
challenge” case whereas WRTL was an “as-applied” challenge case.  As I have argued
throughout this Article and as WRTL itself readily demonstrates, however, this is a
distinction without a difference.245
The failure to honestly address the precedential value of McConnell is problematic
in itself.246  An equally troubling outgrowth of WRTL’s as-applied challenges fueled
end-run around stare decisis, is that it has left a muddled and incoherent doctrinal
framework for addressing corporate and union political advertising regulations.  Here,
Roberts’s opinion in WRTL seemed to imply that there may be two entirely different
doctrinal tests for facial and as-applied challenges.  In explaining why McConnell’s
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247 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
248 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 466. The Court rejected the FEC’s “conten[tion] that
McConnell already established the constitutional test for determining if an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy: whether the ad is intended to influence elections and has that
effect.” Id. at 465; see also id. at 466–67 (“The fact that the student coders who helped develop
the evidentiary record before the Court in McConnell looked to intent and effect in doing so,
and that the Court dealt with the record on that basis in deciding the facial overbreadth claim,
neither compels nor warrants accepting that same standard as the constitutional test for
separating, in an as-applied challenge, political speech protected under the First Amendment
from that which may be banned.”).
249 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (applying
McConnell and WRTL).
250 Hasen, supra note 217, at 1085.
251 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 242.
254 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (2007).
255 Booker, 543 U.S. at 238; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
holding that it is constitutional to regulate ads which “are intended to influence the
voters’ decisions and have that effect”247 was not controlling in WRTL, Chief Justice
Roberts found simply that McConnell “did not adopt any test as the standard for future
as-applied challenges.”248  While the holding will have the practical effect of allowing
corporations and unions to run most any political advertisement they wish free from
regulation by refraining from using “magic words” that expressly advocated for a can-
didate’s election or defeat, it is also likely to create needless headaches in a handful of
close cases as courts are left to ponder how to read WRTL without completely eviscer-
ating McConnell.249  Thus, instead of “creat[ing] a more honest and more easily applied
campaign finance jurisprudence . . . [by] purport[ing] to resolve the issue in [WRTL]
without overturning a single precedent, [the Court] creat[ed] even more incoherence.”250
The abortion and campaign finance regulation examples both involved the use
of the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine to impact substantive law.  But the
categories are equally distracting and counter-productive when employed as part of
severability analysis.  United States v. Booker251 provides perhaps the best recent illus-
tration of why the facial and as-applied challenges distinction does not add value to
the standard rules of severability and, accordingly, is not useful as a remedial doc-
trine.  In Booker, the Supreme Court famously struck down provisions of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, changing them from a mandatory to an advisory scheme.252
The Guidelines’ constitutional defect was that they required judges to make factual
determinations about a wide array of “sentencing factors,”253 such as whether the
defendant had brandished a firearm during the commission of the offense,254 in order
to determine a defendant’s sentence.  This practice contravened the Court’s Sixth
Amendment rule that it is unconstitutional to sentence an individual to a punishment
greater than the maximum sentence authorized by facts found by the jury or admitted
to by the defendant in a plea agreement.255  Not all of the Guidelines sentences were
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(“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.”).
256 Booker, 543 U.S. at 273.
257 Id.
258 Booker, 543 U.S. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“‘[A] majority of the cases
sentenced under the federal guidelines do not receive sentencing enhancements that could
potentially implicate Blakely.’”  (quoting Hearings on Blakely v. Washington Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (2004) (testimony of Comm’rs John R. Steer
and Hon. William K. Sessions III))).
259 Id. at 276 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, one of cases in Booker involved a sen-
tence that was not unconstitutional. Id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (“Application
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines resulted in impermissible factfinding in Booker’s case,
but not in Fanfan’s. Thus Booker’s sentence is unconstitutional, but Fanfan’s is not.”).
260 Justice Ginsburg was the only Justice to join both the merits and remedial majority
opinions. Id. at 226, 244.
261 Id. at 245–46 (majority opinion).
constitutionally problematic, however.256  This is because, under the Guidelines, the
jury verdict or plea agreement sets an initial sentencing range based on the offense
that is then adjusted based on the judge’s findings.257  In many instances, the judge’s
findings do not involve any enhancements to the sentencing range whatsoever, while
in many others the enhancements might increase the available sentencing range, but
the sentence the judge actually imposes is still within the range authorized by the jury
verdict or plea agreement alone.258  In these instances, there is no Sixth Amendment
violation under the Court’s test.  Accordingly, the sentencing figures at the time
Booker was decided indicated that “the Guidelines could be constitutionally applied
in their entirety, without any modifications, in the majority of cases sentenced under
the federal guidelines.”259
The Booker Court was sharply divided, with one five-Justice majority writing
the merits opinion that held judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines that increased
a defendant’s sentence above what was authorized by the jury verdict or plea agree-
ment alone was unconstitutional, and a different five-Justice majority writing the
remedial opinion which converted the Guidelines from a mandatory to a discretionary
scheme.260  The remedial majority accomplished this result by invalidating, in its en-
tirety, the provision that made application of the Guidelines mandatory as well as a
second provision relating to the standard for appellate review under the Guidelines.261
The remedial dissent, meanwhile, argued for a remedy that would retain the Guidelines
system in its entirety but engraft onto it a jury trial requirement, thereby “preventing
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262 Id. at 246 (describing the approach proposed by the remedial dissent). But see id. at
325 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By allowing jury factfinding in some cases, however, we are
no more ‘engrafting’ a new requirement onto the statute than we do every time we invalidate
a statute in some of the applications that the statute, on its face, appears to authorize.”).
263 The Court had other options, of course. For example, it could have invalidated the
Guidelines in their entirety and left it to Congress to create a new sentencing scheme that
would comply with its holding. The Court’s discussion, however, was limited to these two alter-
natives. See id. at 258–59 (majority opinion) (explaining briefly why the Court did not view
invalidating the Guidelines in their entirety as a viable option); see also Gans, supra note 12,
at 665–66 (“Booker views severability in binary terms. . . . [B]ut, of course, these two choices
hardly exhaust the range of ways a legislature might respond to the Court’s holding that the
Sentencing Guidelines, as written, violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee.”).
264 Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (“Both approaches would significantly alter the system that
Congress designed.”); Metzger, supra note 10, at 891 (“[B]oth the [Booker] majority’s and the
dissenters’ efforts to determine whether, in light of the Court’s Sixth Amendment holding,
Congress would have chosen to retain judge-based sentencing or nondiscretionary sentencing
seem impossibly counterfactual, given the centrality of both these features to the sentencing
system Congress established.”).
265 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
the sentencing court from increasing a sentence on the basis of a fact that the jury did
not find (or that the offender did not admit).”262
It is difficult to see much of a connection at all between the facial and as-applied
challenges categories and the two remedial options in Booker.263  Both of the proposed
remedies—turning the Guidelines from a mandatory to advisory scheme or shifting
the job of finding facts that would increase a defendant’s sentence from the judge to
the jury—would fundamentally alter the system Congress enacted.264  Thus, the Court
was presented with a decision about how best to redesign a complex, detailed sentenc-
ing scheme so that it would conform with a constitutional rule that rendered one of
its central features—mandatory judicial fact-finding—unacceptable.
The facial and as-applied challenges categories, of course, have nothing to say
about which of these options would be more faithful to Congress’s intent (the lynch-
pin of severability analysis), which would be less disruptive as a practical matter, or
which would be better as a matter of policy.  In the context of severability analysis,
the categories are artificial and mechanical: any invalidation of a provision or statute
in whole is a “facial” challenge; anything else is an “as-applied” challenge.  Even
as a purely technical matter, however, it is hard to see how one option or the other
would more closely fit within the as-applied challenges category.  While the majority’s
remedy was certainly a “facial challenge” as it involved striking down two of the
Guidelines’ provisions in their entirety,265 the dissenters’ proposed approach was also
a far cry from the traditional definition of an “as-applied” challenge.  The dissenters’
remedy would have meant engrafting a new requirement, at least implicitly, onto the
Guidelines that the government charge in the indictment and prove to the jury beyond
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266 Id. at 254–55 (“Would the indictment have to allege, in addition to the elements of
robbery, whether the defendant possessed a firearm, whether he brandished or discharged it,
whether he threatened death, whether he caused bodily injury, whether any such injury was
ordinary, serious, permanent or life threatening . . . ?”).
267 See id. at 255 (“How would the court take account, for punishment purposes, of a
defendant’s contemptuous behavior at trial—a matter that the Government could not have
charged in the indictment?”) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2004));
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) (“At the sentencing hearing, the court . . . must rule on any unre-
solved objections to the presentence report. . . . For each matter controverted, the court must
make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because
the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing.”).
268 Booker, 543 U.S. at 275–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that severing
sections of the Guidelines to turn them into an advisory system was inconsistent with the
Court’s “facial invalidity cases”).
269 Id. at 274. Stevens acknowledged that the Court has “debated the proper interpretation
of various precedents concerning facial challenges to statutes” but argued that the “debate
was immaterial to [his] conclusion here, because it borders on the frivolous to contend that the
Guidelines can be constitutionally applied ‘only in a fraction of the cases [they were] originally
designed to cover.’” Id. at 275 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).
270 Id. at 280.
271 Id. at 319–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). Justices Thomas and Stevens wrote sepa-
rately because of differences over the use of legislative history in addressing severability and
the characterization of severability principles. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 892 (explaining
that while Justice Thomas viewed the remedial question as a severability issue, Justice Stevens
a reasonable doubt any conduct that could lead to sentencing enhancements.266  As a
result, a number of the Guidelines’ provisions, such as the sentencing enhancement
based on a defendant’s contemptuous behavior at trial, would have been rendered a
nullity as a practical matter even if they were not technically invalidated.267
Nevertheless, in their remedial dissents Justices Stevens and Thomas reserved
some of their strongest criticism for the majority’s approach to facial challenges.
Justice Stevens devoted the first section of his dissent to the argument that the major-
ity’s remedy was inconsistent with the law of facial and as-applied challenges.268  He
claimed that a court may only invalidate a provision of a statute in its entirety if it “is
unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its applications.”269  Because the Guidelines
could be applied constitutionally in a large number of cases, Stevens argued, “there is
no justification for the extreme judicial remedy of total invalidation of any part of
the . . . Guidelines.”270  Justice Thomas similarly argued that, “[g]iven the significant
number of valid applications of all portions of the current sentencing scheme, we
should not facially invalidate any particular section of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Guidelines, or the SRA” and should instead “invalidate only the appli-
cation [of the provisions applied] to Booker, at his previous sentencing hearing.”271
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argued that the real issue was constitutional avoidance rather than severability).
272 Booker, 543 U.S. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens argued that sev-
ering a statute’s provisions was not appropriate, however, in the case of “application sever-
ability.” In a footnote, Stevens conceded that the Court had struck down entire statutes that
had constitutional applications in prior cases, but distinguished these cases on the grounds that
they “did not, as the majority would have us do, strike down particular parts of the statute.”
Id. at 283–84 n.8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 284 n.8 (“None of these cases stands for
the sweeping proposition that where parts of a statute are invalid in certain applications, the
Court may opine as to whether Congress would prefer facial invalidation of some, but not
all, of the provisions necessary to the constitutional violation.”) Stevens’s concession further
highlights the irrelevance of the facial and as-applied challenges distinction in addressing
severability questions. Even under Justice Stevens’s view of severability, courts would be
able to invalidate entire statutes that had constitutional applications on their face—just not
“particular parts of the statute.” Id.
273 Id. at 323 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). Oddly, in the sentence immediately before his
description of the standard for facial invalidation according to severability principles, Justice
Thomas argued that the presumption of severability was “a manifestation of Salerno’s general
rule that we should not strike a statute on its face unless it is invalid in all its applications.”
Id. Of course, Justice Thomas’s standard for severability is fundamentally incompatible with
Salerno’s rule because, like all theories of severability, it allows courts to invalidate a statute
in its entirety even if it is not “invalid in all of its applications.” Id. at 314 (discussing the
Court’s holding in Salerno). Indeed, arguably the main function of severability doctrine is
to guide those determinations.
After leading their dissents with discussions of facial challenges, however, both
Justices Stevens and Thomas went on to acknowledge that facial invalidation of a law
with constitutional applications was indeed possible under severability principles.
Justice Stevens began his severability discussion by noting that “[e]ven though a
statute is not facially invalid, a holding that certain specific provisions are unconsti-
tutional may make it necessary to invalidate the entire statute.”272  Justice Thomas
characterized the standard for severability as allowing for facial invalidation of a
statute that has constitutional applications, though only if “the Legislature clearly
would not have enacted the constitutional applications independently of the unconsti-
tutional application.”273  And so, immediately after arguing that the majority’s remedy
was incompatible with the standard for facial and as-applied challenges because it
invalidated a statutory provision with constitutional applications, Justices Stevens
and Thomas both conceded that invalidating a statute that has constitutional applica-
tions on its face is perfectly acceptable after all so long as the result is warranted under
severability doctrine.  In other words, notwithstanding their strident rhetoric about
facial challenges, Stevens and Thomas agreed that the remedial question was ultimately
a question of severability law, which in fact permits “facial” invalidation of a statute or
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274 See Metzger, supra note 10, at 892 (“Justice Stevens’ . . . claim that the Court lacked
authority to facially invalidate provisions that could have constitutional applications” was
“wrong as a matter of logic” and contradicted by his later acknowledgment that “the uncon-
stitutionality of some parts of a statute may force its invalidation as a whole if those provisions
are not severable.”).
275 See id. at 890.
276 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (“While all of the remedial
possibilities are thus, in a sense, second best, the solution Justice Stevens and I would adopt
does the least violence to the statutory and regulatory scheme.”).
277 Metzger, supra note 10, at 891.
278 Booker, 543 U.S. at 248 (“Neither can we determine likely congressional intent mechani-
cally. We cannot simply approach the problem grammatically, say, by looking to see whether
the constitutional requirement and the words of the Act are linguistically compatible.”).
279 See, e.g., id. at 291–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress had
considered and rejected an advisory sentencing system).
280 Justice Scalia’s opinion, which focused exclusively on the practical impact of the
majority’s remedy, was the exception here and demonstrates what a distraction the facial and
as-applied challenges categories were in Stevens’s and Thomas’s dissents by comparison. See
id. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“The majority’s remedial choice is thus wonderfully
ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to eliminate discre-
tionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing.”).
provision that is capable of constitutional applications.274  Accordingly, the “doctrine”
of facial and as-applied challenges added nothing to the remedial debate in Booker.
The facial and as-applied challenges discussion in Booker was more than just un-
helpful, however.  It detracted from the case, and in particular the dissents, by serving
as a distraction from the truly important remedial questions and clouding the dissenters’
approach to severability.  The Court was presented with a decision between making
the Guidelines advisory and turning factual determinations for sentencing over to a
jury.275  Each option would significantly change how federal sentencing functioned.
By focusing on facial and as-applied challenges, however, the dissenters pushed the
practical impact of these options to the background.  The thrust of the dissenters’
facial and as-applied challenges arguments seemed to be that the Court should choose
whichever remedy would make the fewest mechanical changes—as judged by the
elimination of words or provisions from the statute—to existing law.276  Even the
dissenters, however, ultimately admitted that severability analysis was controlled by
legislative intent.277  And, of course, it is hard to imagine that legislatures are con-
cerned with how a court’s remedy would impact the semantics of a law rather than
how it would affect its real world application.278  To be sure, the dissenters ultimately
addressed legislative intent and made strong arguments that their solution was prefer-
able from that perspective.279  But, in relying on facial and as-applied challenges, they
largely glossed over the fact that their proposed solution was also a dramatic change
from the Guidelines scheme, which served to undercut the strength of their arguments
about the merits of each approach.280
704 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:657
281 See, e.g., id. at 325 (Thomas J., dissenting in part) (“Applying the Guidelines constitu-
tionally . . . might seem at first glance to violate [adherence to congressional intent]. . . . [Yet]
[i]n the end, nothing except the Guidelines as written will function in a manner perfectly
consistent with the intent of Congress . . . .”).
282 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
283 See supra notes 150–61 (discussing the Randall Court’s decision to strike down the
Vermont law in its entirety because reforming the system would have required significant
changes and under such circumstances the legislature would have intended for the Court to
set aside the limits in their entirety to leave it free to draft a constitutional scheme); see also,
e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973) (striking down a Pennsylvania tuition re-
imbursement law in its entirety because severing unconstitutional applications would have
“create[d] a program quite different from the one the legislature actually adopted”); Gans,
supra note 12, at 690–92 (arguing that the Booker Court should have invalidated the Guidelines
in their entirety). Interestingly, prior to the successful Sixth Amendment challenge to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal courts disputed remedial issues about the Guidelines
in the context of challenges based on separation of powers arguments. The split among ap-
proaches to severability of the Guidelines was so wide that, after the Supreme Court upheld
them as constitutional, one observer expressed relief that the decision had “[m]ercifully . . .
pretermitted” severability questions about the sentencing law. Nagle, supra note 164, at 218;
see id. at 216–18 (providing an overview of early cases that dealt with severability of the
Guidelines); see also Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1268 (9th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to sever provisions curtailing good-time credits after finding the Guidelines uncon-
stitutional under a separation of powers theory; “Congress having chosen a ‘comprehensive’
approach to making sentencing more determinate, we will not sever companion sections of
the guidelines system that would introduce piecemeal reforms”).
Perhaps more problematic, by advancing the facial and as-applied challenges
argument, the dissenters did not leave themselves room to seriously consider the
remedial option of scrapping the Guidelines in their entirety.  While invalidating the
Guidelines entirely may or may not have been the best outcome, the absence of any
serious discussion of the possibility in Booker is striking.  This is because the merits
decision in Booker left the Court facing the sort of choice where the argument for
holding a law that is capable of constitutional applications invalid in its entirety is gen-
erally thought to be at its strongest.  The only way for the Court to save the Guidelines
was to make dramatic changes that would leave them fundamentally different from
the scheme Congress enacted.281  Similarly, this was not a situation where the legisla-
tive options for enacting a new law that would comply with the Court’s decision were
limited.  It is easy to imagine a wide array of sentencing schemes that would be con-
stitutional under the Court’s Sixth Amendment rule.  As discussed above, this was
exactly the sort of scenario in which the Court in Randall v. Sorrell282 decided to strike
down Vermont’s campaign finance contribution limits system in its entirety without
so much as mentioning facial or as-applied challenges.283  And, Randall reached this
result even though the Vermont law surely could have been “constitutionally applied”
to prohibit, for example, an individual from donating $1 million to a campaign.  In-
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284 Randall, 548 U.S. at 269–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
285 Booker, 543 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court has the burden of
showing that Congress would have preferred the remaining system of discretionary Sentencing
Guidelines to not just the remedy I would favor, but also to any available alternative, including
the alternative of total invalidation, which would give Congress a clean slate on which to write
an entirely new law.”).
286 Cf. Gans, supra note 12, at 665 (arguing that severability doctrine gave the Booker Court
a “limited set of options” that led it to view the remedial question “in binary terms”).
287 Randall, 548 U.S. at 262.
deed, the Randall Court itself indicated that some of the law’s contributions provisions
were constitutional.284
Yet, even though Justice Stevens referenced the option of completely invalidating
the Guidelines and indicated that it may be a favorable alternative to the majority’s
approach, neither he nor any of the other Justices seriously entertained the idea.285
Of course, one can only speculate about the reasons for this omission, but assuming
the dissenters had preferred invalidating the statute entirely to the majority’s approach,
their use of the facial and as-applied challenges rhetoric to defend their first-choice
jury trial remedy effectively blocked them from advancing that position.  This is be-
cause the as-applied challenges argument framed the remedial question in terms of
which outcome would depart least from the original text of the statute.286
In this way, the facial and as-applied challenges categories are more than just a
distraction to the task of fashioning a remedy to a constitutional violation.  They can
work to limit remedial options by implying that grammatical fidelity is the sole cri-
teria upon which the outcome should be judged.  As cases like Randall make clear,
however, that view is far from the Court’s actual severability doctrine, which looks pri-
marily to legislative intent and allows the presumption of severability to be overcome
by competing considerations, such as when the only way to save a statute is by dra-
matically altering its scope.287  Moreover, as Booker itself demonstrates, in some cases
the remedial options do not fall neatly into the “facial” or “as-applied” boxes even if
viewed merely as descriptive categories.  As a result, employing the categories as part
of severability analysis causes confusion, not clarity, and leads to less uniformity from
case-to-case than would result if courts were to analyze all remedial questions by
relying on severability doctrine alone.
CONCLUSION
Courts and most commentators treat the so-called presumption in favor of
as-applied challenges as a well-established and universally applicable principle of
constitutional adjudication.  This is true even among critics of Salerno’s more con-
troversial “no set of circumstances” formulation.  This Article presents a challenge
to this conventional account of facial and as-applied challenges.  I argue, first, that as
it stands now the facial and as-applied challenges doctrine is fundamentally incoherent.
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The most basic questions about its meaning, such as whether the doctrine relates to
constitutional interpretation, severability, or a combination of the two, remain un-
answered.  At a minimum, any effort to reconcile the inconsistencies in the law of
facial and as-applied challenges that other commentators have persuasively identified
will need to clearly resolve this problem.
This Article also claims, however, that the project of crafting a doctrine of facial
and as-applied challenges is destined to fail because the facial and as-applied catego-
ries are inherently incapable of being reduced to a single generally applicable set of
rules.  This is because determinations about the fate of a constitutional challenge to a
statute involve a number of different considerations, none of which are amenable to
being governed by principles derived from the two categories.  With respect to the task
of interpreting the constitution and implementing its protections through constitu-
tional rules, any rule about the use of facial challenges simply begs the question of the
definition of the particular constitutional protection at issue.  The Court can implement
constitutional provisions through conduct-oriented tests that focus on individual
action, through tests that focus on government action, or by combining the two
approaches.  As a result, the only way a doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges
could conceivably govern the Court’s design of constitutional rules and tests is if it
were to impose a uniform approach to constitutional interpretation by, for example,
holding that the Constitution protects only individual conduct.  A look at the land-
scape of constitutional law, however, indicates that such a uniform set of rules for
interpreting different constitutional rights would be disruptive, undesirable, and with-
out any discernable basis in the Constitution.  The facial and as-applied challenges
categories fair somewhat better, perhaps, if they are viewed as being strictly related
to remedial considerations.  At least in that context, the labels accurately describe
the two most likely outcomes in most constitutional challenges.  But, even here, a
“doctrine” of facial and as-applied challenges adds nothing to the law of severability
and, indeed, ultimately detracts from it.  This is because most difficult questions in the
area of constitutional remedy require a court to choose from a number of possible
remedies, not just two.  In a complex regulatory scheme like Vermont’s campaign
finance law, for example, the constitutional deficiency may result not from any single
provision but from a number of provisions working in concert.288  In that situation,
a court might technically be able to save the law by severing some of the provisions
in different combinations.  Should the court attempt to save the law by deciding which
combination of changes it prefers or scrap the law entirely?  The facial and as-applied
challenges categories cannot help guide courts in these circumstances.
Finally, this Article considers why, if all of the foregoing is correct, the Court
operates in many cases as if there is a uniform and well-established law of facial and
as-applied challenges.  I argue that upon closer examination, the Court’s “doctrine”
of facial and as-applied challenges turns out to be little more than a rhetorical device
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289 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 244, at 1537–41 (noting various instances in which the Court
has “abandoned the principle of stare decisis” by “purport[ing] to respect a precedent while
in fact cynically interpreting it into oblivion”).
used to add support to the narrower remedy or constitutional rule in a given case.  As
a result, the Court’s use of facial and as-applied challenges is more than just un-
helpful; it is a harmful distraction that leads to a lack of clarity in the law and an
artificial preference for constrained definitions of constitutional rights.  To be sure,
these problems are not unique to the context of the facial and as-applied challenges
doctrine.289  The doctrine, however, provides an especially convenient tool for a Court
to avoid directly confronting conflicting precedent or to help justify adopting a narrow
constitutional rule.
All of this, I believe, suggests that the Court would be better served by acknowl-
edging that there is, in fact, no uniform law of facial and as-applied challenges and that
there almost surely never will be.  Instead, when confronted with an argument that
a law or provision should be struck down in its entirety, the Court should focus its
attention on more thoroughly and directly addressing the underlying issues—namely,
the constitutional right and doctrine at issue along with principles of severability—that
actually animate the outcomes in constitutional challenges.
